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INTRODUCTION

Surprisingly, perhaps, little attention has been paid to recording, analyzing,
and safeguarding the history of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the
DCCA) in any systematic fashion. Ironically, the DCCA, which is overshadowed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, often
is confused with that court. Laypersons and scholars alike have manifested some
difficulty understanding the court system in the District of Columbia. In large
measure, this difficulty is traceable to the historic functioning of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as both a federal
court and as a local court for the nation's capital until the Congress of the United
States created the DCCA in the early 1970s. It is also attributable to the close
relationship between federal law and District of Columbia law. Indeed, District
of Columbia law often mirrors federal law since Congress generally enacted statutory law for the District prior to its delegation of certain legislative powers to a
newly created local legislature, part of a home rule government, in 1973.1 Books
have been written on the history of the federal courts of the District of Columbia,
with passing references to historic, specialized local courts, such as the Juvenile
* The Hon. Inez Smith Reid is a judge on the D.C. Court of Appeals. These are the first chapters for a book about the Honorable Julia Cooper Mack, undertaken in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the University of Virginia Graduate Program for Judges. Unless otherwise noted,
background information on Judge Mack comes from the author's interviews with her on April 23,
2003, April 29, 2003, May 1, 2003, and February 16, 2004.
1 Under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power "[t]o
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles
square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the
Government of the United States .
I..."
in 1973, Congress enacted the District of Columbia SelfGovernment and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973), commonly known as "the Home Rule Act."
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Court. But comparable historical works on the District of Columbia courts, reorganized by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 1970,2 have not yet emerged. There are, however, fragments of that history located in law review articles, newspaper accounts (some of which may be
described as editorial in nature, or even inaccurate), various offices in the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, and the minds of judges who have served on the
DCCA since 1971.
The history of the DCCA is significant, not only because it emerged as a political reaction to a federal/local circuit in the nation's capital deemed to be too
liberal for the more conservative members of Congress, but also because of its
focus on issues confronting District of Columbia residents, and the professional,
corporate, or other entities working or doing business in the nation's capital.
These issues are wide-ranging-from simple and complex criminal or civil matters, to issues confronting children and their families, to attorney disciplinary
matters, and to a host of agency actions relating to workers' compensation, unemployment benefits, historic preservation and zoning, housing, local elections, and
government as well as private sector employment. Often they are the same type
of issues confronting different geographical areas of American society, but they
may be highlighted because the District is the nation's capital, which on numerous occasions serves as a "laboratory" for the nation as a whole.
My goal at the outset of this project was to begin to compile a history of the
DCCA, its judges, and its important opinions by focusing upon a limited case
study of the Honorable Julia Cooper Mack, the first African American woman to
be nominated by a President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate to
sit on a state-equivalent court of last resort, that is, the highest court in the stateequivalent jurisdiction. Judge Mack served on the DCCA as first an Associate
Judge and then as a Senior Judge, from mid-1975 to December 2001. As my
interviews with Judge Mack unfolded, however, it struck me that it was equally
essential to make the historical connection between this prominent juristknown for opinions protective of the welfare and rights of children, the poor, the
criminally accused, and the home rule government of the District of Columbiaand Free Negro Aaron Revels who fought in the Revolutionary War, as well as
Lewis Sheridan Leary and John Anthony Copeland, Jr., who joined forces with
John Brown in an effort to free enslaved men and women and to shield runaway
slaves from recapture. What is perhaps remarkable, although not surprising,
about this historical link is Judge Mack's virtual silence about her historic family.
Her silence is not surprising because she is a characteristically reserved person
who keeps her own counsel and rarely shares personal information.
The added historical dimension of my original goal in a sense enhances the
thesis with which I began. Given the political environment of the nation's capital,
2

Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970). The Act took effect on February 1, 1971.
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I envisioned my thesis not as a definitive resolution but as a modest contribution
to understanding whether judges of the District of Columbia's highest local court
are influenced by the political whirlwinds that surround them. My thesis is that
through twenty-six years of her tenure as an active and senior judge of the
DCCA, Judge Julia Cooper Mack kept her own counsel, and her numerous majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions were influenced neither by the exterior
political world surrounding her nor by the exhortations of her DCCA colleagues.
Rather, Judge Mack's approach to the resolution of legal issues, as an Associate
Judge and later a Senior Judge of the DCCA, was impacted by her heritage, her
quiet opposition to injustice, her deep concern for the vulnerable members of
American society, and by her notions of fair play and justice, all grounded in her
experiences in North Carolina and the nation's capital.
For my study, I have adopted a hybrid methodology. It is not the pure approach of Leonard W. Levy in his The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief
Justice Shaw, which focused in part on the biography of Chief Justice Shaw, but
also engaged in "the intensive analysis of major cases," and afforded a glimpse
into "a selected aspect of American legal history," such as the era of the Fugitive
Slave law and the early days of school segregation in Boston. 3 Nor does my study
concentrate on a whole body of law as it existed in a specified time period, such
as William E. Nelson's treatment of the law of New York as decided by state
court judges over a sixty-year period, which he described as "a monographic,
historical synthesis of the century's developments in state constitutional law or in
the common law."4 Neither does my study present an analysis of every single
opinion-majority, concurring and dissenting-that Judge Mack has written.
Perhaps my study comes closest to the Leonard Levy model, but it is by no
means as comprehensive as Levy's, and it does not offer a definitive view of
Judge Mack's approach to a wide range of legal issues confronting the DCCA
during her twenty-six year tenure. But it does combine a biographical/case study/
general overview approach to Judge Mack and her tenure on the bench. It links
the jurist to historical persons, events, and experiences that helped shape her
analysis of judicial cases. It uses the case study method to examine cross-racial
adoption, a social and cultural issue pertaining to the welfare of black children in
need of permanent homes. And it also affords a short, general overview of Judge
Mack's approach to home rule issues in the District of Columbia; to certain criminal procedural issues; and to discrimination in employment, housing, and university activities. Simultaneously, the study provides some insight into the history
and creation of the unique court system to which Judge Mack was appointed, as
3

LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW

109 (1957).
4 WILLIAM E. NELSON,
YORK, 1920-1980 1 (2001).

THE LEGALIST REFORMATION:

3-5, 19,

LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW
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well as the backgrounds of some of the judges with whom Judge Mack interacted
during her judicial career.
II.

THE EARLY DAYS:

A
A.

UNIQUE FAMILY AND COURT SYSTEM

The Family

Judge Mack's formative years were marked by her heritage and the oral his-

tory of that heritage, which is grounded both in the world of North Carolina Free
Negroes, and in the resistance of slave Negroes. Both her parents were natives of
Fayetteville, North Carolina, and Judge Mack's winding road to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals began in Fayetteville on July 17, 1920.

One of the central landmarks of Fayetteville which stands prominently in
Judge Mack's mind is Market House, the historic place where slaves were sold.
According to family oral history, her mother's grandfather was sold at Market
House. Her father's ancestors, the Learys and the Perrys, were longstanding
members of the Free Negro community. The worlds of those free and slave Ne-

groes would coalesce at Harper's Ferry in 1859.
An early member of the Leary/Perry family was Aaron Revels, a Free Black

who fought in the Revolutionary War.5 He has been described as "one of the
patriots and soldiers in the struggle for liberty in America," and, as a Free Negro,
he "voted after the Constitution of 1776 was ratified." 6 Aaron Revels' daughter,

Sara Jane Revels, married Jeremiah O'Leary, whose ancestors were Irish and
Croatan Indian. 7 The "0" soon was dropped in favor of "Leary," and the Leary
family began its long history.
Matthew Nathaniel Leary, the grandson of Aaron Revels and the son of Jer-

emiah O'Leary and Sara Jane Revels O'Leary, was born in North Carolina on
February 15, 1802 and was reared in Fayetteville; he became a harness maker and

a wholesale businessman.8 He married Juliette Meimoriel in 1825. She was born
in France, but was taken to the French West Indies by her mother, Mariette
Colostic Williard Meimoriel, and then to Fayetteville, North Carolina. 9 Several
5 See Matthew Leary Perry, The Negro in Fayetteville, in JOHN A. OATES, THE STORY OF FAYETTEVILLE AND THE UPPER CAPE FEAR 695-96, 708, 714 (1950). Aaron Revels' cousin was the first
African American to serve in the United States Senate. Id. at 708, 714.
6 Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Inc., The Leary Family, X NEGRO HISTORY BULLETIN 27 (1946) (hereinafter Leary Family).
7 Id. at 27. Sara Jane Revels' first name also appears in historical works as "Sarah."
8 Perry, supra note 5, at 698; Leary Family, supra note 6, at 27-28. Matthew Nathaniel Leary
trained young men in the harness making business, some of whom relocated to Oberlin, Ohio. In
addition, he gave money "to [slaves] to purchase their freedom." Id.
9 Id. at 28. The name of Juliette Meimoriel also appears variously as Mumrelle, Memerelle, and
Memriel. Oswald Garrison Villard states that "Jeremiah O'Leary.. . fought in the Revolution under
General Nathaniel Greene, and married a woman of mixed blood, partly [N]egro, partly that of Croatan Indian stock of North Carolina, which is believed by some to be lineally descended from the 'lost
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children were born to Matthew Nathaniel Leary and Juliette Anna Meimoriel,
including Matthew Nathaniel Leary, Jr., Lewis Sheridan Leary, Henrietta Leary,
Sara Leary, John Sinclair Leary, and Mary Elizabeth Leary. 10 All of these great
grandchildren of Aaron Revels and children of Matthew and Juliette Leary led
productive, even distinguished lives, half of them in North Carolina and Washington, D.C., and the other half in Ohio.
Matthew Leary, Jr., became a businessman and politician who served in government posts in Washington, D.C. 1 John Sinclair Leary studied law at Howard
University and became the second Negro to be admitted to the North Carolina
Bar. He was elected to the state legislature of North Carolina in 1868, served on
the school committee for both white and colored schools from 1878 to 1882, and
was active in local and national Republican Party politics, beginning in 1867.12
Mary Elizabeth Leary studied music under private tutors in Fayetteville and Chicago. She attended St. Augustine College in Raleigh, North Carolina and later
became a teacher, as well as church organist at St. Joseph's Episcopal Church in
Fayetteville. She married Dallas Perry, Sr., known as "an
outstanding architect
13
father.
father's
Mack's
Judge
became
who
builder,"
and
The three Leary children who moved to Ohio were destined to become part of
history. The two sisters, Henrietta and Sara Leary, married the Evans brothers,
Henry and Wilson, both Free Blacks active in the movement to free slaves and to
assist runaway slaves by protecting them from recapture. Both were cabinet
makers and upholsterers. 14 When Henrietta and Sara Leary's brother, Lewis
Sheridan Leary, joined them in Oberlin, Ohio, he formed ties with the Evans
brothers, as well as with John Anthony Copeland, Jr., reported to be his nephew.
Lewis Sheridan Leary and John Anthony Copeland, Jr., lost their lives because
they believed deeply in John Brown's mission to Harper's Ferry. As she grew up
in Fayetteville, the oral history of Sheridan Leary and John Copeland, reflecting
the interrelationship between the world of free and slave blacks, was pressed into
15
Judge Mack's memory. Sheridan Leary, born on March 17, 1835 in Fayetteville,
has been described as "[a] handsome light-eyed man who wore his wide-brimmed
hat at a rakish tilt," the son of "Julie Memriel, a Guadeloupian.' 16 He journeyed
to Oberlin, Ohio in 1856 or 1857, where his married sisters lived. The Cheeks
colonists' left by John White on Roanoke Island in 1587." OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, JOHN
BROWN, 1800-1859, A BIOGRAPHY FIFTY YEARS AF'ER 685-86 (1966).
10 Leary Family, supra note 6, at 28-30; ROBERT E. GREENE, THE LEARY-EVANS, OHIO'S FREE
PEOPLE OF COLOR 10-11, 38 (1979).
11 Leary Family, supra note 6, at 28.
12 Perry, supra note 5, at 714-15.
13 Leary Family, supra note 7, at 30, 32.
14 WILLIAM CHEEK & AIMEE LEE CHEEK, JOHN MERCER LANGSTON AND THE FIGHT FOR
BLACK FREEDOM, 1829-65 (1989).
15 VILLARD, supra note 9, at 685-86.
16 CHEEK, supra note 14, at 355.
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state in their extensive work on John Mercer Langston that one of his sisters was
named "Delilah." The 1946 Negro History Bulletin article on the Leary Family
does not mention a sister by the name of Delilah. The article states, however,
that there were seven offspring of the union between Juliette Meimoriel and John
Mercer Langston, but does not name the seventh child. The Cheeks identify Delilah Copeland as Sheridan and Henrietta's sister, and John Copeland, Jr., as
"[Sheridan] Leary's nephew." Villard also identifies Sheridan Leary and John
Copeland, Jr., as uncle and nephew, 17 suggesting that there indeed was a third
18
sister, Delilah.
Delilah was married to John Anthony Copeland, Sr., a mulatto, who, like
Judge Mack's father's father, earned his living as a carpenter.1 9 Delilah and John
Copeland, Sr.'s son, John Anthony Copeland, Jr., was born a Free Negro in Raleigh, North Carolina on August 15, 1834, but moved to Oberlin, Ohio with his
parents in 1842.20 He studied in the preparatory department at Oberlin College.21 Some works indicate that both Copeland, Jr., and Sheridan Leary studied
at Oberlin. 22 Sheridan Leary learned the harness making business from his father, Matthew, and worked under a harness maker in Ohio, John Scott. Copeland, Jr., has been depicted as "serious" and "a man of few words."'23 After
spending 1854-1855 as a student in Oberlin's preparatory department, Copeland,
Jr., assisted his father in the carpentry business. During the evening hours, he
often listened intently to the accounts of fugitive slaves who sought refuge in
Ohio.2 4
Both Sheridan Leary and Copeland, Jr., came into contact with men known as
"rescuers," those who like the Evans brothers sought to rescue blacks from slavery and to prevent their recapture. And they encountered John Mercer Langston, an imposing, brilliant orator who was a graduate of Oberlin, a lawyer and
the elected clerk of the Oberlin Township. Like his brother Charles Langston, he
passionately deplored slavery, actively opposed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,
25
and emerged as a champion of the continuing freedom of black slave fugitives.
17

VILLARD, supra note 9, at 684.

18 There is some confusion in the literature as to exactly how John Copeland, Jr., and Sheridan
Leary were related, whether through the Leary or the Evans family tree. GREENE, supra note 10.
19 CHEEK, supra note 14, at 355 and 378 n.23.
20

VILLARD, supra note 9, at 684.

21 Id.
22 Historian Merrill D. Peterson identified Lewis Sheridan Leary and John A. Copeland, Jr., as
"students in the college." MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE LEGEND REVISITED, JOHN BROWN 36 (2002).
The Cheeks do not identify Sheridan Leary as a student at Oberlin. Nor is he so mentioned, as is
Copeland, Jr., in ROBERT SAMUEL FLETCHER, A HISTORY OF OBERLIN COLLEGE, FROM ITS FOUNDATION THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 414 (1943).
CHEEK, supra note 14, at 356.
24 Id.
25 John Mercer Langston later would become Howard University Law School's first dean, and,
even later, the United States Minister to Haiti and Santo Domingo. Information in this paper about

23
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Undoubtedly Charles Langston's reaction to the Supreme Court decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 6 concluding that Dred Scott could not be a citizen of
Missouri and belonged to an inferior class of people who constituted mere chattel
despite his claim to status as a Free Negro, affected both Sheridan Leary and
Copeland, Jr. In a letter to the then Governor of Ohio, Salmon P. Chase, later
appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1864, by Abraham Lincoln, Charles Langston, joined by other blacks from Columbus, Ohio protested
the Dred Scott decision: "So gross, so monstrous, so unparalleled a judicial outrage... overtaxes our patience, well nigh extinguishes our hopes - almost goads
27
us into madness."
Sheridan Leary and Copeland, Jr., were members of the Ohio State Anti-Slavery Society.28 When fugitive slave-hunters seized John Price and took him to
Wellington, Ohio in September 1858, Copeland, Jr., was part of a group of black
men and white abolitionists who went to Wellington determined to free Price and
return him to Oberlin. Copeland, Jr., and two other black men overpowered
Price's captors, set him free, and took him to Oberlin. This remarkable rescue,
called the Oberlin-Wellington Rescue, served as a catalyst for other anti-slavery
activity by the men of Oberlin Township, including their participation in John
29
Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry.
Although Copeland, Jr., was indicted for his role in the John Price rescue, he
managed to "evade arrest" and thus was not tried.3 ° One month before the early
April 1859 trial of the other rescuers, John Brown took to Ohio some blacks who
had been freed from slavery in Missouri. Sheridan Leary heard John Brown
speak about his mission in opposition to slavery. 31 Four months later, John MerJohn and Charles Langston is taken primarily from the work by William and Aimee Lee Cheek.
CHEEK, supra note 14.
26 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
27 CHEEK, supra note 14, at 324.
28 Id. at 352.
29 Id. at 316-48.
30 Id. at 329.
31 Brown had discussed some of his plans with Frederick Douglass over the years in Rochester,
New York. He met with Douglass in 1847 and discussed his plan to assist slaves to fight for their
freedom by concealing some of them in the Allegheny Mountains in Maryland and Virginia for later
battle, and sending some northward to freedom. Douglass summarized Brown's mission as a secret
plan to assemble "a few sound men, to establish a base in the mountains to which slaves and free
Negroes would come, and ... a free state would be set up." PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850-1860 88 (1950). In August 1859,
Brown related to Douglass his plans to attack Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and to take as hostages leading citizens of that locality in an effort to gain the release of slaves in the area. While Douglass was
not prone to participate in Brown's plan and disapproved of the Harper's Ferry idea, he recruited a
runaway slave who resided with him to join Brown. Id. at 89. Shields Green, the runaway slave later
joined Sheridan Leary and Copeland, Jr., in John Brown's mission. John Brown's mission has been
discussed in a number of works, including PETERSON, supra note 22, and OSWALD GARRISON V1LLARD, JOHN BROWN (1943).
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cer Langston introduced Sheridan Leary and Copeland, Jr., to John Brown, Jr.
John Brown, Jr., had arrived in Ohio in August 1859 to recruit "any Ohioan,
white or black, who might be persuaded to strike and die for the American bondman."3 2 After listening to Brown, Jr., and hearing the views of John Mercer
Langston, Sheridan Leary and Copeland, Jr., cast their lot with Brown, deciding
"to die, if need be."33 On October 6, 1859, they went to Cleveland, met with
Brown, Jr., and then began their journey to Harper's Ferry. 34 They arrived at
their destination on October 15, 1859. Brown's mission at Harper's Ferry began
the following night. Sheridan Leary received a fatal bullet wound in his back on
October 17, 1859, as he sought to swim "the rapids of the Shenandoah. ' 35 Copeland, Jr., was captured, survived cries that he be lynched,36 but was executed on
December 16, 1859, after being tried and found guilty of "murder, and inciting
slaves to insurrection.",3 7 In a letter to his parents, written on November 26,
1859, Copeland, Jr., said:
[M]y fate as far as man can seal it is sealed, but let this not occasion you any
misery for remember the cause in which I was engaged, remember that it
was a 'Holy Cause,' one in which men who in every point of view better
than I am have suffered and died, remember that if I must die I die in trying
to liberate a few of my poor and oppress[ed] people from my condition of
serveatud which God in his Holy Writ has hurled his most bitter denunciations against and in which men who were by the color of their faces removed from the direct injurious affect, have already lost their lives and still
more remain to meet the same fate which has been by man decided that I
38
must meet.
Upon hearing of her son's death, Delilah Copeland stated: "If I could be the
means of destroying slavery, I would willingly give up all my menfolk." 39 Later, a
32 Id. at 354.
33 Id. at 357.
34 Before he left on his journey to Cleveland and Harper's Ferry, Sheridan Leary asked John
Mercer Langston to ensure that his wife, then twenty-three years of age, and child "never know
want." Id. at 358. Through the efforts of the Langston brothers and others, Sheridan Leary's wife was
able to supplement her work as a milliner and to return to the preparatory department at Oberlin
College for more schooling. In January 1869, she married Charles Langston. Id. at 361-62. Of historical note, Sheridan Leary's wife became the maternal grandmother of the poet, Langston Hughes.
PETERSON, supra note 22.
35 VILLARD, supra note 9, at 445; CHEEK, supra note 14, at 358.
36

VILLARD, supra note 9, at 445.

37 CHEEK, supra note 14, at 358-59. The charge of treason was dropped on the theory that
under the Dred Scott case, blacks were not citizens and hence could not be found guilty of treason. Id.
at 358. Shields Green also survived the thrust on Harper's Ferry and, like Copeland, Jr., was tried and
adjudged guilty. Id.
38

VILLARD, supra note 9, at 684.

39

CHEEK, supra note 14, at 356.
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monument "eight feet high and weighing half a ton" was placed in the Oberlin
cemetery in honor of Sheridan Leary, Copeland, Jr., and Shields Green. An inscription on the monument stated simply: "These colored citizens of Oberlin, the
heroic associates of the immortal John Brown, gave their lives for the slave." 4
By 1859, the year of Harper's Ferry, coming on the heels of the Dred Scott
decision, the legal status of Free Negroes in North Carolina, as elsewhere, had
declined, and extreme hostility toward them from the larger society had escalated. For example, one North Carolina county issued the following declaration:
We, the Grand Jury of Cleveland County, North Carolina do present, that
free Negroes in general are a nuisance to society; and that it would be expedient to have a law requiring them to leave the State, and for a failure to do
so, that they should be exposed to public sale, the proceeds arising therefrom be applied to the Literary Fund of our State. Adopted by unanimous
41
consent.
In the same year, a bill was introduced in both houses of the North Carolina
legislature "concerning Free Persons of Color." Under that proposed legislation,
Free Negroes were given two years in which to move out of North Carolina, and
those who remained without permission of the General Assembly of North Carolina faced arrest and sale as slaves." 2 Although none of the proposed legislation
actually passed, the anti-Free Black sentiment was clear. Some Free Negroes
found themselves resisting efforts to send them to Haiti or parts of Africa, or to
enslave them. Struggles to retain their freedom and livelihoods, and to stave off
the type of frustration that prompted pleas for enslavement, became a common
experience of Free Negroes in North Carolina in the decade of the 1850s. 43 That
struggle continued in the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Early
members of Judge Mack's family were typical, perhaps, of Free blacks about
whom John Hope Franklin, the historian, said: "Free blacks were a group unto
themselves. They worked, played, struggled to improve their legal and economic
status .... Many of them emerged from the dim shadows of their anomalous
44
position to become not merely distinct persons but even heroic figures."
Consistent with their rich legacy, and carrying forward the oral history of their
ancestors, members of the Leary/Perry families continued the business enterprises and professional occupational traditions of their free black ancestors. They
also continued to struggle to maintain their freedom, rights, dignity, and lives.
Four children were born to the union of Mary Elizabeth Leary Perry (the
youngest child of Matthew and Juliette Leary) and Dallas Perry. Matthew Leary
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 361.
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA:

Id. at 214.
See generally FRANKLIN, supra note 41, at 192.
Id. at x.

1790-1860 213 (ed. 1995).
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Perry, Judge Mack's uncle, became a prominent physician in Fayetteville. He
established a non-profit hospital in Fayetteville for the care of pregnant women
and children; and he and his brother, Dr. John Sinclair Perry, also a physician,
"owned and operated the Mercy Hospital at Hamlet, North Carolina, for a number of years," and also practiced in Wilmington, North Carolina.45 In addition,
he enjoyed a distinguished career in Washington, D.C., as a neuropsychiatrist,
serving both at St. Elizabeth's Hospital and the old Freedmen's Hospital (now
Howard University Hospital).4 6 Mary E. Leary Perry II, Judge Mack's aunt, was
a musician who received her training at the New England Conservatory of Music
in Boston. She established the Music Department at what eventually became
Fayetteville State Teachers College. She also headed the music departments at
Shaw University and St. Augustine's College in Raleigh, North Carolina.47
Judge Mack's father, Dallas Leary Perry, Jr., was a pharmacist and a pharmaceutical chemist at the Fort Bragg army post.48 During World War II, he was in
charge of the drug manufacturing department there, and made medicines for
soldiers. 49 He married Emily McCoy in 1917, a Fayetteville, North Carolina public school teacher. Although she could have traveled north to one of the more
prestigious colleges, Emily McCoy elected to stay in North Carolina to be close to
her family. So she attended St. Augustine College, an Episcopal college in Raleigh, North Carolina, and entered the teaching profession after her graduation.
Dallas and Emily Perry had two children, Mary Elizabeth Perry (Robinson) and
Julia Emily Perry (Cooper Mack).
B.

The Court System

While the unique history of the Leary/Perry family was evolving, the District
of Columbia Court system reflected its own historical uniqueness. Just as the
District of Columbia, created as the seat of the federal government through land
cession from Maryland and Virginia, is a unique political entity, so too is its court
system. Initially, the District of Columbia was dependent on the courts of Maryland and Virginia, whose powers stretched into the federal enclave that became
the nation's capital. The District soon acquired its own courts to handle judicial
matters in the District's counties-the County of Washington and the County of
Alexandria.50 Emanating from the historic political controversy between John
Adams' Federalists and Thomas Jefferson's Anti-Federalists or Republicans, the
45 Perry, supra note 5, at 708-09.
46 Leary Family, supra note 6, at 34, 47.
47 Id. at 34.
48 Judge Mack's father's father was a noted carpenter who made distinctive furniture. Interview with Judge Mack.
49 Perry, supra note 5, at 706; author's interview with Judge Mack (Apr. 23, 2003).
50 Edwin Melvin Williams, The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, 1801-1863, in WASHINGTON PAST AND PRESENT: A HISTORY 209-10 (John Clagett Proctor ed., 1930).
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federal Act of February 27, 180151 established a Circuit Court of the District of

Columbia with appellate power and local trial authority in both civil and criminal
matters, a District Court (charged with maritime matters), as well as an Orphan
Court (for trust and probate cases) in each of the counties of the District; and
justices of the peace presided over Levy Courts whose jurisdiction covered taxes,
liquor licenses, and other matters. 52 Judges were to be appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.5 3
Before Thomas Jefferson could take the oath of office, John Adams quickly

named three men to the Circuit Court in the District: Thomas Johnson of Maryland as Chief Judge; James Marshall of Alexandria 54 (the brother of John Marshall, Secretary of State under Adams whose swift appointment to the Supreme
Court of the United States as Chief Justice was destined to carve out a new base
of power for the Federalists); and William Cranch of Washington. Thomas Johnson declined the appointment and was replaced by William Kilty.55 Judges of the
two Orphan Courts were also appointed. Simultaneously with the designation of
Circuit and Orphan Court judges, President Adams signed the commissions of
some forty-two justices of the peace.
The first major change in the structure and functions of the District's court
system occurred in 1863, also as a result of political controversy spawned by the
Civil War. The Civil War produced a clash between military and judicial authority. 56 Fearing that the courts of the District of Columbia might be too sympathetic to southern interests, Congress abolished the Circuit Court and criminal
courts, and created a Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by the Act of
March 3, 1863. 57 Designed as a court of "general jurisdiction in law and equity,"
the court consisted of four justices nominated by the President and confirmed by
51 2 Stat. 103.
52 Id. at 210, 247. The Circuit Court took over the functions of the "Hustings Court of Alexandria and the Mayor's Court of Georgetown." Id. See also JEFFREY MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 6 (2001); CHRISTOPHER P.
BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT 8 (1999). As a result of the overload on the Circuit
Court, a separate criminal court was created in 1823. Williams, supra note 50, at 221.
53 Williams, supra note 50, at 210.
54 In the press of his duties during his final days as Secretary of State under Adams, John
Marshall asked his brother James to retrieve and deliver commissions to forty-two justices of the
peace appointed by President Adams during his last days as President. James Marshall was not able
to carry all of the commissions, and one of those left behind belonged to William Marbury. Marbury
later sought to obtain his commission. His effort resulted in the well-known case of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
55 Williams, supra note 50, at 211.
56 See Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Symposium: The Bicentennial Celebrationof
the Districtof Columbia Circuit. Celebratingthe 200th Anniversary of the FederalCourts of the District
of Columbia, 90 GEORGETOWN L.J. 549, 552-59 (2002).
57 12 Stat. 762. See Williams, supra note 50, at 223; MORRIS, supra note 52, at 366.
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the Senate. 58 President Lincoln was determined that the Supreme Court would
address national issues in a critical period of history. He "considered it of the
utmost importance that there should be a court in the national capital composed
of judges of national reputation with positive and strong convictions in accord
with the policies of the administration on all questions then disturbing the country."'59 Part of President Lincoln's concern centered on efforts to re-enslave Free
Negroes. In President Lincoln's view, the courts of the District of Columbia had
a duty to protect the freedom of ex-slaves or Free Negroes, rather than aid in the
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law through the issuance of warrants against
persons of color.6 °

Although the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia existed until 1936,
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia was established, in 1893,61
solely as an appellate court, to put an end to the anomalous situation under which
justices of the Supreme Court sat on cases in their appellate term that had been
handled by members of that same court in its trial term. By 1909, a Municipal
Court had been created. Eventually, this court exercised "exclusive
power in
'
civil cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $1,000. 62
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia steadily increased in power
and status as it first transformed itself into the United States District Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1934,63 to make clear its status as an
Article III court, under the Constitution of the United States, rather than an
Article I court.64 Then, in 1942, the court became the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, placing it on the same footing with
other federal circuit courts.6 5 The power of the dual federal/local court system
was solidified in 1936 when the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
ceased to exist and the District Court for the District of Columbia took its
place.66 In 1948, the District Court's name changed to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, and the title "justice" was dropped in favor of
67
"judge.

'

As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United
States Court for the District of Columbia increased their powers, lesser courts in
the District continued to handle matters viewed as less important. The Police
58 Williams, supra note 50, at 226.
59 Williams, supra note 50, at 266.
60 Williams, supra note 50, at 228.
61 Act of Feb. 9, 1893, 27 Stat. 434.
62 Williams, supra note 50, at 250. An appeal from the Municipal Court had to be filed in the
Court of Appeals rather than the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Id.
63 Act of June 7, 1934, 48 Stat. 926.
64 Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 561.
65 Act of Dec. 9, 1942, 56 Stat. 1094.
66 Act of June 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1921.
67 Act of June 25, 1948. 62 Stat. 991.
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Court, created in 1870, had jurisdiction over matters such as prohibition and regulatory offenses, and the Juvenile Court handled cases involving juvenile delinquents, neglected children, child labor law violations, and school attendance
68
matters.
III.

Two

WINDING ROADS DESTINED TO MEET

The winding road traveled by Julia Emily Perry Cooper Mack and the winding
road resulting in the creation of the DCCA were destined to meet. Julia Emily
Perry would make her own mark in history, despite a near fatal hit and run accident in childhood in Hamlet, North Carolina that left her with a stutter and slight
difficulty with oral communication. 69 Because of the accident, she did not enter
formal school until the third grade. Prior to that, she was taught by her mother.
She attended the State Normal School in Fayetteville, described by Judge Mack
as "a practice school" or a "normal school" with "wonderful teachers." In addition to the usual curriculum, she was taught black history. Moreover, she was
urged to compete in statewide essay competitions. She chuckled over one such
competition that she won during the depression. Her essay was on "the family
cow," although she "had never been near a cow." As a result of her victory, the
governor of North Carolina invited her to the State Capitol and escorted her on a
tour. Her prize for that victory was $15.00 in gold.
Although Julia Perry's parents were protective of her and her older sister
Mary "in a dignified way" as they grew up in segregated North Carolina, she was
influenced in large measure by "Mama Jul," her mother's mother, as well as her
father's accounts of Sheridan Leary. "Mama Jul" believed in resisting wrongdoing, and used to teach Julia Perry to hold her ground when members of the white
community wanted to exclude her or push her away, as some white children did
when she traversed the sidewalks. "Mama Jul would say, 'If you let them put you
out, I'll beat you when you get home.'
Although Julia Perry "g[o]t into a few fights" trying to hold her ground, she
adopted her parents' philosophy: "live to live another day; bide your time."
Nevertheless, her father, whom Judge Mack described as "a gentle, sweet guy,"
was always poised to protect his family against harm. After the birth of his first
child, he lived through riots in Winston Salem, North Carolina. Family oral history relates that he armed himself and stayed at the window constantly when he
was home to stave off any attack on his family. During Julia Perry's first year of
high school in Wilmington, North Carolina where one of her father's drug stores
68 Williams, supra note 50, at 252-54.
69 Unless otherwise noted, background information on Judge Mack comes from the author's
interviews with her, in Washington D.C., on April 23, 2003, April 29, 2003, May 1, 2003, and February
16, 2004.
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was located, her father slept with a gun on his pillow to foil robbery or other
potentially harmful behavior by others.
Yet, there were light moments as Julia Perry moved through her segregated
community where white newspapers declined to print anything favorable about
Negroes. A neighbor, "an amply built lady who was married to a preacher,
would go up to the separate water fountains and she would say, 'Oh, they have
white water and they have black water. I think I'll try a bit of both."' These kinds
of moments taught Julia Perry how "to live with [Jim Crow] and to exist." But
other people along the way urged a more activist stance. During her high school
days, an African American aviator, known as "the Black Eagle," spoke to the
student body and advised them to boycott companies that discriminated against
Negroes. Later, during World War II when Judge Mack's first husband, Jerry
Cooper, visited her and their baby in North Carolina, he was pushed off the train,
despite his Navy uniform. When Julia Perry Cooper recounted this incident to
Dr. James Nabrit, Jr., at Howard University where she then worked, he told her
all she had to do was "go limp," but, with a laugh while reminiscing about the
incident, Judge Mack stated, "I'm not the 'go limp' type."
As she approached graduation at age sixteen from the E.C. Smith High School
in Fayetteville where she excelled in scholarship, debating and dramatics, Julia
Perry received scholarships to historic Fisk University and Hampton Institute.
She elected to go to Hampton, although her sister Mary had followed her
mother's footsteps to St. Augustine College and graduated at age seventeen. At
Hampton, Judge Mack encountered what today would be perceived as a rather
strict environment-no dating boys for six months and suspension for smoking in
the dorm room. Aside from her academic curriculum, with concentrations in
mathematics and English, at the mandatory nightly vespers Julia Perry was exposed to the world of music-Nathaniel Dent in particular, organ music and spirituals. Outstanding personalities of the day would visit the campus, including the
educator Mary McCleod Bethune who would recount her contacts with Eleanor
Roosevelt.
Judge Mack's introduction to law came through her avid interest in and love
for drama and the theater. In one of the plays produced at Hampton, Julia Perry
played the part of a wife on trial for the murder of her husband. The audience
served as the jury. A verdict of "not guilty" was rendered at her performance at
Hampton, but at another college, she was found guilty. That experience sparked
her interest in law, although her entry into law school would be delayed for some
time.
After earning her Bachelor of Science degree in 1940, Julia Perry first taught
school in North Carolina and Catonsville, Maryland. Her assignment in Catonsville was interrupted when she collapsed from a life-threatening streptococcus
infection. Her father arranged for her to be treated at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. As she could find humor in the segregated conditions of Fay-
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etteville, North Carolina, Julia Perry also found humor in that illness-watching
her concerned parents rush to her side at the hospital-her father pulling on a
mask and her mother in her sister's borrowed fur coat as nerves overcame her.
While recovering from that illness, Julia Perry became convinced that she had
survived for a reason, and the reason soon became clear.
Beginning in September 1942, Julia Perry Cooper worked as an Assistant Registrar at Fayetteville State Teachers College. Upon her return to the Washington,
D.C. area, she used her experience at Fayetteville Teachers College to obtain a
position in the Registrar's office at Howard University as an Admissions Clerk.
She served in that capacity from June 1946 to June 1948, a position which allowed
70
her to keep her baby daughter close by, playing on the spacious basement floor.
While working in the Howard University complex, Julia Cooper encountered two
men who were destined to leave their own historic marks on the worlds of education and law.
It was Dr. Matthew J. Whitehead, then Assistant Registrar at Howard and
later President of Miner Teachers College (which became D.C. Teachers College
and later was merged into the University of the District of Columbia), who encouraged Julia Perry to go to law school. And she met Dr. James Madison
Nabrit, Jr., then a professor at the law school, who would go on to collaborate
with attorney Thurgood Marshall on the school desegregation cases of the 1950s,
and argue Brown v. Board of Education's companion case, Boiling v. Sharpe. In
1960 Dr. Nabrit would become President of Howard University. One other man
proved influential in directing Julia Perry Cooper to law school, George Johnson,
then Dean of Howard University's law school. Dean Johnson was instrumental
in helping Julia Perry Cooper to win a Jesse Smith Noyes Foundation scholarship
to defray the costs of law school, and she was able to work part-time in Dr.
Nabrit's office.
Julia Perry Cooper's graduating law school class was small, consisting of three
women and approximately twenty mature men, generally veterans of World War
II, out of a class of some thirty-seven students. Eventually six members of that
small class became judges. During the summer months she worked in the office
of Dr. Mordecai Johnson, the legendary first African American President of
Howard University, appointed in 1926. Among her professors at Howard Law
School were Dr. Nabrit, who taught contract law as well as civil rights law, Herbert 0. Reid, a civil rights lawyer, and Howard Jenkins, a labor lawyer. She had
one female professor, Jane M. Lucas, who resigned at the end of Julia Cooper's
70 By that time, Julia Perry Cooper no longer was with her first husband, Mr. Cooper. She had
"a difficult time" with her first marriage when she discovered that her values and interests were not
altogether compatible with those of her husband. When their daughter Cheryl was four years old, the
Coopers were divorced, and Julia Perry Cooper experienced the life of a single parent attempting to
find a decent place to live and a job to support herself and her daughter. Author's interview with
Judge Mack (Feb. 16, 2004).
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second year of law school.71 Aside from proving her ability to master academic
legal studies, Julia Perry Cooper manifested the kind of personal qualities essential for leadership. She became the second woman in the history of Howard's law
school to attain the position of Chief Justice of the Court of Peers, the law stu72
dent governing body, and was also a member of the Howard Law Journalstaff.
After her graduation from law school in 1951, Professor Charles Quick facilitated Julia Perry Cooper's hiring at the federal Office of Price Stabilization, in
July 1951, where she wrote documents pertaining to price control rates. Her appointment was announced by a Mr. Manseur who stated: "Our program in keeping with President Eisenhower's wishes calls for the employment of eligible
persons to whatever positions they are qualified for. Mrs. Cooper meets the high
standards set by our Department under the reorganization program. We expect
her to fill her new post with honor and credit to the agency." 73 Her colleagues at
the Office of Price Stabilization included Harry Alexander and Harold
Leventhal, both of whom would become judges. (Harold Leventhal, who was
nominated as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in 1965 by President Johnson, "brought to [that] Court a quickwitted, superbly analytical and cultivated mind and a ready pen." 74 )
While working on price control matters, Leventhal once unexpectedly called
Julia Perry Cooper on a Sunday to help him revise a speech. In making this
weekend call for help with what must have been a pressing assignment, Mr.
Leventhal must have recognized Julia Perry Cooper's strong analytical mind and
her skill in using the written word. Years later, Judge Leventhal would be identified with the liberal wing of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia under the David Bazelon court.7 5 As we shall see, opinions emanating
from that wing of the court prompted Congress to enact legislation creating the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 1970 to stop the flow of opinions
deemed favorable to criminal defendants.
When Democrats lost the White House, and the Office of Price Stabilization
was closing down because Republicans were not champions of price control, the
head of the agency warned Julia Perry Cooper that she would have difficulty
finding another job because she was African American, female, and had a child.
His words were prophetic and she found herself without a job in March 1953, just
71

HOWARD UNIVERSITY, BISON (1951) (yearbook).

72 During Julia Perry Cooper's first year in law school, Damon Keith served as Chief Justice of
the Court of Peers. Later in life he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
73 Jan. 14, 1954, unidentified newspaper clipping from the files of Judge Mack.
74 MORRIS, supra note 52, at 198. Judge Leventhal was educated at Columbia College and
Columbia University Law School, and clerked for Supreme Court Justices Harlan Fiske Stone and
Stanley Reed. He served as General Counsel of the federal Office of Price Administration from
1940-43. Id. at 198-99.
75 Bazelon served as Chief Judge of the court from 1962-1979. MORRIS, supra note 52, at 371.
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months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., Inc.,76 which not only sustained the use of two Reconstruction

Era statutes to attack racial discrimination in the Thompson restaurants in the
District of Columbia, but which also paved the way for the Congress of the
United States to delegate legislative power to a local District of Columbia
legislature .77

Julia Cooper Perry soon joined the "mourner's bench" at the Court of General
Sessions, waiting for appointments to defend criminal clients. She learned the
ropes of a nuts-and-bolts criminal law practice representing "mostly poor and

wretched [people]," those who were alcoholics, those involved in domestic violence, prostitutes, and others. She described herself as "a lousy trial lawyer" in
what resembled a police court. But she learned the basics of practicing law from

other lawyers who also occupied the "mourner's bench." Her tour of duty as a
solo practitioner ended as a result of a contact made by her first husband's
mother,78 and the insistence "by civil rights activists" that the federal government
cease its discriminatory policies against blacks who sought professional employment in the government.7 9
That contact, and the labors of those who fought racial discrimination in the
government, landed Julia Cooper Perry a position in the federal General Services
Administration during the McCarthy era, at about a GS-6 or 7 level. She was the
first black attorney hired by the GSA.8 ° Immediately she felt the sting of

prejudice. Her office turned out to be "a little closet," and "[tihe white secretaries were asked if they minded working for [her]." When the contact who helped
76 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
77 The Supreme Court declared:
[S]o far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is no doubt that legislation which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the use of facilities serving a public function is
within the police power of the states. It would seem then that on the analogy of the delegation of powers of self-government and home rule both to municipalities and to territories
there is no constitutional barrier to the delegation by Congress to the District of Columbia of
full legislative power, subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is
subservient and subject also to the power of Congress at any time to revise, alter, or revoke
the authority granted ....
We conclude that the Congress had the authority under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution
to delegate its lawmaking authority to the Legislative Assembly of the municipal corporation
which was created by the Organic Act of 1871 and that the "rightful subjects of legislation"
within the meaning of § 18 of that Act was as broad as the police power of a state so as to
include a law prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the owners and managers of
restaurants in the District of Columbia.
John R. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U.S. at 109, 110 (citation omitted); see also Marvin Caplan Eat
Anywhere!, 1 WASH. HIST. 25 (1989), for the story of the struggle to desegregate Thompson's
restaurants.
78 Author's interview with Judge Mack (Apr. 23, 2003).
79 Derrick Bell, Essay: A Gift of UnrequitedJustice, 40 How. L.J. 305, 309 (1997).
80 Id. at 309.
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her secure the GSA position discovered how she was being ostracized in the little
closet, he protested and she was moved to a better office.
Julia Cooper Perry's work at GSA centered on the McCarthy hearings, and
she was assigned to question witnesses. The experience was "awful." Some of
the witnesses "didn't have a chance" and "black folks were persecuted." She was
chastised when she did not pronounce "some part of the world correctly." The
cafeterias were separated along color lines. But, in 1956, she was rescued from
GSA by a job offer from the Department of Justice, where she became the first
black female attorney8 1 and where she was destined to meet her mentor, Beatrice
82
Rosenberg.
Beatrice Rosenberg, who died in 1989 at age 81, was a consummate, demanding but sensitive career lawyer who discovered upon her return from a vacation
that Julia Perry Cooper had been hired to work in her criminal division at the
Justice Department. Ms. Rosenberg immediately spotted in Julia Perry Cooper
the kind of qualities she valued. Explaining how her close relationship with Ms.
Rosenberg developed, Judge Mack stated simply: "She learned that I knew how
to write." The two women worked well together, and over the years authored a
significant number of briefs for the circuit courts and the Supreme Court of the
United States.
A graduate of Wellesley College and the New York University School of Law,
Ms. Rosenberg joined the criminal division of the Justice Department in 1943,
83
and rose to the position of chief of the criminal division's appellate section.
Judge Mack recalled that the criminal division was filled with young white men
and one white woman when she arrived. Ms. Rosenberg proved to be "a hard
task master," and "Ivy League schools didn't mean anything to her." She once
"hired a guy from Harvard [but] fired him the next day." A bond of friendship
grew between Ms. Rosenberg and Julia Perry Cooper, and both immersed themselves in the stressful, demanding job of drafting appellate court briefs. During
her tenure at Justice, Julia Perry Cooper labored for Ms. Rosenberg and approximately six Solicitors General. Her name, alongside that of Beatrice Rosenberg,
appears as government attorney on briefs filed in countless cases in the late fifties
and the decade of the sixties, many of which Ms. Rosenberg argued in the Supreme Court of the United States.8 4 Julia Perry Cooper, too, argued cases before
81 Bell, supra note 79, at 309.
82 Around 1956, Julia Perry Cooper married Clifford J. Mack, who had been a helpful friend to
Julia Cooper and her daughter. She married Mr. Mack, a person whose qualities she obviously admired and respected, after a talk with her father. They remained together until his death on the eve
of her elevation to the DCCA. Author's interview with Judge Mack (Feb. 16, 2004).
83 Tribute to a Mentor: Woman Lawyer Shaped Careers of Hundreds, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,
1989, at B5.
84 During Ms. Rosenberg's memorial service, former Solicitor General of the United States and
Dean of Harvard Law School, Erwin N. Griswold, stated that Ms. Rosenberg's "more than 30 argu-
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the Supreme Court, "the first black woman to represent the federal government
85
in argument before [that] Court.
The important cases handled by Ms. Rosenberg and Julia Perry Cooper are
too numerous to mention here, but they covered areas of search and seizure,
deportation and habeas corpus, eavesdropping, and other criminal matters. Of
these cases, only three will be mentioned: Mallory v. United States,86 because of
its importance to the decision to create the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and Hill v. United States87 and Marchibroda v. United States,88 because
Julia Perry Cooper argued them before the Supreme Court.
Mallory is a historic case pertaining to proper criminal procedure for handling
criminal suspects after their arrest. William B. Bryant, then an attorney appointed to represent criminal defendant Andrew Mallory in a terrible rape case,
and later a Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
sought to free his client by arguing a violation of criminal procedural rules due to
excessive pre-arraignment delay (eighteen hours between arrest and arraignment) and interrogation resulting in a confession by Mr. Mallory. After Mr. Mallory's conviction, Bryant appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. There a panel composed of Judges E. Barrett Prettyman, David Bazelon, and Walter Bastian issued a divided opinion affirming his conviction. The majority found no procedural problem with the delay
and the confession, concluding that "the delay was not unreasonable" 89 under
McNabb v. United States.90 But Judge Bazelon dissented, calling the delay "inexcusable and illegal." 9 1 When the case advanced to the Supreme Court, Julia
Cooper Perry and Beatrice Rosenberg were government attorneys on the brief.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed Mr. Mallory's conviction and, relying
on its decision in McNabb v. United States,92 held that arraignment must follow
arrest "as quickly as possible," or any confession obtained could be excluded
from evidence in the District of Columbia, notwithstanding its voluntary nature.
ments before the Supreme Court placed her in a class with Daniel Webster in the 19th century and
John W. Davis in this century." WASH. TiMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at B5.
85 Bell, supra note 79, at 309.
86 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
87 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
88 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
89 Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
90 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
91 Mallory, 236 F.2d at 707.
92 In McNabb, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943), the Supreme Court required suspects in the custody of
law enforcement authorities to be arraigned "without unnecessary delay." Confessions extracted during periods of unnecessary delay could be excluded from evidence in federal courts, even if voluntary.
The McNabb legal principle was codified in 1946 in Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
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Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous court and reinforcing the McNabb
decision, declared:
We cannot sanction this extended delay, resulting in confession, without
subordinating the general rule of prompt arraignment to the discretion of
arresting officers in finding exceptional circumstances for its disregard. In
every case where the police resort to interrogation of an arrested person
and secure a confession, they may well claim, and quite sincerely, that they
were merely trying to check on the information given by him. Against such
a claim and the evil potentialities of the practice for which it is urged stands
93
Rule 5(a) as a barrier.
As we shall see, application of the Mallory principle by the D.C. Circuit bitterly
divided the conservative and liberal factions of the court and in part contributed
to the creation of the DCCA.
Hill and Machibroda were Sixth Circuit cases argued by Judge Mack during
her tenure in the Department of Justice. In a collateral attack on his conviction
for transporting a kidnapped person and a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce,
Mr. Hill claimed that his procedural right under Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to make a statement personally at his sentencing hearing
had been violated. Ruling in favor of the government and affirming Mr. Hill's
conviction, a Supreme Court majority held through Justice Stewart "that the failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) is not of itself an error that
can be raised on collateral attack." 94 Machibrodawas similar to Hill in one respect. Justice Stewart, writing again for the majority, reaffirmed the holding in
Hill, "that the failure of the District Court specifically to inquire at the time of
sentencing whether the petitioner personally wished to make a statement in his
own behalf is not of itself an error that can be raised by motion . . . or Rule.
...
The majority concluded, however, that Mr. Machibroda's conviction on
charges of bank robbery had to be vacated because the trial judge had to hold a
hearing regarding Mr. Machibroda's allegations that his pleas of guilty were involuntary and had been induced by governmental promises of leniency, and because "[a] guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
96
character of a voluntary act, is void."
Through Mallory, Hill, Machibroda and countless other criminal cases for
which she drafted briefs and presented appellate court argument, Julia Perry
Cooper steeped herself in the nuances of criminal procedure. In addition, because of her deep experience of more than a decade in the Department of Justice,
she readily understood and could recognize the weaknesses of the government's
93
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case. Undoubtedly this experience helped to shape the jurist who later would
decide important criminal cases appealed to the DCCA.9 7
In January 1968, almost fourteen years after the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,9 Julia Perry Cooper joined the General Counsel's staff at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Her days at the EEOC were difficult ones as she sought to enforce anti-discrimination laws in the midst of internal and external politics and interpersonal conflicts. 99 Reflecting on those days, Judge Mack commented: "I had a lot of
courage at EEOC because I had the backing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
Of particular note was Julia Perry Cooper's struggle to weed out discrimination against African Americans at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Many of these HUD employees had been confined and stalled
in GS-3 and GS-4 positions for years. She was "[c]ertified as an Equal Employment Opportunity Appeals Examiner by the Civil Service Commission in
1970, '' 1° ° and was "threatened" by the Civil Service Commission as she held
hearings on the plight of these African American government workers. She
heard extensive testimony despite the "rude[ness]" she encountered. The
"rude[ness]" led her to confer with then Chairman of the EEOC, William H.
Brown III, whom Judge Mack described as "a courageous chairman." He sup97 Judge Frank Nebeker became acquainted with Julia Perry Cooper while he served as Chief
of the Appellate Division for the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia.
Because of understaffimg of that division during his tenure, Ms. Rosenberg asked some of the Justice
Department's Criminal Division attorneys to assist him. Julia Cooper Perry wrote "a goodly number"
of appellate briefs for the U.S. Attorney's office and "argue[d] the cases." Judge Nebeker recalled
that one of the cases assigned to Julia Perry Cooper "was a rape case and at that point rape was a
capital crime in the District of Columbia." Although she prepared the brief for the case, "she informed [Frank Nebeker] that she would not argue to uphold a capital verdict." Nebeker argued the
case and "lost it, because [one] couldn't get a capital verdict through the D.C. Circuit at that time."
Interview with Judge Nebeker (Apr. 7, 2003).
98 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99 Initially, the EEOC, created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, did not have extensive powers, and could not even initiate a complaint or sue, and generally was dependent on referrals
to the Attorney General of the United States. RAYFORD LOGAN & MICHAEL R. WINSTON, THE
ORDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 39-40, 158-60 (1971). Despite its inability to initiate suits, the EEOC discovered through research by young lawyers that it could enter suits brought by others through the
amicus curiae route. Julia Perry Cooper and other EEOC lawyers "would appear as amicus and argue
the case and help with the briefs [of others], and file [their] own brief." Author's interview with
Judge Julia Cooper Mack (May 1, 2003).
When she started at the EEOC, Julia Perry Cooper was the only African American woman in the
General Counsel's office. She endured clashes at one time between an African American male chairman of the Commission and her Caucasian General Counsel. Once when the situation between the
two men became overheated, her General Counsel decided to leave abruptly, and instructed her (his
deputy at that time) also to depart. But the Chairman of the Commission ordered her to remain. In
reminiscing about that episode, Judge Mack stated: "I didn't know what to do. Finally I said, 'Gentlemen, if you don't care about me, please care about the EEOC."' Id.
100 Bell, supra note 79, at 310.
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ported her and through the hearings she amassed compelling facts clearly showing the discrimination that the workers suffered. Those testifying at the hearings
included "poor people," "the janitors and the messengers," and other low-level
employees. HUD took action against the employees, punishing some 103 of
those who protested racial discrimination. Through Julia Perry Cooper's persistence, HUD was cited for racial discrimination. In 1971, the agency acknowledged past discrimination, agreed to drop charges against protesting
10 2
employees, 10 1 and "conceded its liability.'
In a letter dated March 21, 1974, William H. Brown III heaped praise on Julia
Perry Cooper for her EEOC work in general, and in particular for her labors on
the HUD case. He pointed out that "[tihe only person the charging parties and
their attorney and the agency agreed upon to serve as the appeals examiner for
the HUD case [was Julia P. Cooper]." She was given EEOC's "highest award" in
1971, "[i]n recognition of her continued dedicated service." Mr. Brown also
wrote: "By her own example she perhaps more than anyone in the Commission
substantially raised the standards of performance of the lawyers and other employees who came in contact with her. [Employees] turned to her for wise counsel
10 3
and objectivity. I was never disappointed.'
Mr. Brown appointed Julia Perry Cooper to the position of Associate General
Counsel, Appeals Division, Office of General Counsel at the EEOC in 1972.
That same year, she called her former associate at the Department of Justice,
Beatrice Rosenberg, and "asked if she could spare some young lawyers to work
in litigation in the appellate section." Ms. Rosenberg replied, "I don't have anyone I want to send but I'd like to come." The two women once again collaborated on legal matters as Julia Perry Cooper "supervised the bringing of hundreds
of actions in the federal courts" after Congress conferred on the EEOC the right
to sue.'0 4
By 1973 and 1974, Julia Perry Cooper's achievements at the EEOC were well
recognized. One of her former General Counsels, William A. Carey, commented
in 1973: "Julia Cooper is one of the most brilliant attorneys and skilled administrators I have ever known. She deserves a lion's share of credit for most of General Counsel's major achievements. She is warm and friendly, a delightful person
to have in a position of authority."' 1 5 In 1974, she was given the coveted Tom C.
Clark award by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger "for her dedicated hard work in
,shaping litigation which emerged during the early years of developing the civil
101
102
103
author).
104
105

Paul Delaney, Housing Agency Yields on Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1971, at 38.
Bell, supra note 79, at 310.
Letter from William H. Brown III, Chairman of EEOC (Mar. 21, 1974) (on file with
Id. at 310.
1 EEOC COMMISSION NEWSLETrER (Nov. 1973).
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rights laws." 10 6 Her work at the EEOC undoubtedly was not far from Judge
Mack's mind when she later handled employment discrimination cases in her role
as an appellate court judge.
While she was immersed in her work at the EEOC, the District of Columbia
Judicial Nomination Commission sent three names including that of Julia Perry
Cooper to the White House for a vacancy on the DCCA. One of the other persons on the list was Wiley Branton, a civil rights attorney who, among other assignments, was Thurgood Marshall's (later Justice Marshall of the Supreme
Court) co-counsel in the Little Rock, Arkansas school desegregation case in the
1950s.1 ° 7 Julia Perry Cooper, with her vast years of experience as a highly
praised, pioneering government lawyer, including many years at the Department
of Justice, received the nomination for the vacancy from President Gerald Ford
on July 3, 1975, and was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 1975. She took the
oath of office on September 2, 1975.108 Her winding road finally had met that of
the DCCA.
Creation of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA)
At the time of Judge Mack's appointment to the bench, the DCCA was a very
young court. Created by the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970,109 the court actually began to function in 1971. The genesis of the DCCA is
attributable to political dissatisfaction with decisions emanating from the liberal
wing of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
during the Bazelon Court, when there were classic disagreements between Chief
Judge David Bazelon and Judge Warren E. Burger, reflecting the division of the
court into clear liberal and conservative camps by 1962.110 At the time, Richard
Nixon occupied the White House and promoted a law and order theme.
According to Christopher Banks, the D.C. Circuit "had a reputation in the
1960s as a liberal or activist bench that was allegedly too sympathetic to the rights
of criminal defendants and perhaps the politically disadvantaged." 1 1 ' Morris
106 Bell, supra note 79, at 310.
107 ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 152
(1992). Ultimately the Little Rock school desegregation case, involving resistance by the Governor of
Arkansas and others, was argued before the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
108 As her tenure in the DCCA began, Julia Perry Cooper assumed the name of her second
husband, Clifford Mack, a government employee whom she had married around 1956. Tragically, he
died of cancer before she took the oath of office. Author's interview with Judge Mack (Feb. 16, 2004).
109 Act of July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 475, Pub. L. No. 91-358.
110 BANKS, supra note 52, at 11-12, 14-18 and accompanying notes. Identified with the liberal
camp were Chief Judge David Bazelon and Judges J. Skelly Wright, Charles Fahy, Spottswood Robinson, Henry Edgerton, Harold Leventhal, George T. Washington, and Carl McGowan, while Judges
Warren E. Burger, John Danaher, Wilbur Miller, and Walter M. Bastian were considered members of
the conservative camp.
111 Id. at 11.
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agrees: "During the sixties, the Court of Appeals [for the District of Columbia

Circuit] was often sharply divided, especially over criminal, landlord-tenant, and
mental-health112issues. The court was effectively split into 'liberal' and 'conservative' wings.",
Chief Judge Bazelon became "the target of extensive criticism (if not vilification) mainly from conservatives, both on and off the court. "113 "Many" trial
court judges "objected to being constantly overturned on appeal by the liberal
leaning 'Bazelon Court."' 114 And, the Bazelon Court was reported to have "infuriated President Nixon . . .and political conservatives in Congress who strenu-

ously disagreed with the scope and direction of [the D.C.] [C]ircuit's
policymaking in criminal law."' 115 Particularly unsettling and galling to political
conservatives was their review or recollection of the liberal camp's application of

Mallory and the tendency of that camp to throw out confessions based on the
Mallory rule. For example, between 1960 and 1963, one case festered and became a catalyst for change. James Killough murdered his wife and hid her body
upon finding that she was having an affair with another man. The trial judge
excluded the confession made by Mr. Killough prior to his preliminary hearing
because he had been held for thirty hours, but admitted inculpatory statements
made after the preliminary hearing. Although he was convicted and a majority of
the three judge appellate panel confirmed his conviction, a 5-4 majority of the en
banc court reversed on the ground that the confession was wrongfully obtained
while Mr. Killough was incarcerated and without counsel. The four dissenters
wrote individual opinions which sounded the theme that criminals were being
outrageously overprotected. Matters did not improve after Mr. Killough was retried and found guilty, but when once again on appeal, his conviction was reversed, this time because a subsequent confession made to an intern at the jail
had been made in confidence, and therefore should not have been admitted into
1 16
evidence.
Added to the conservative discontent with criminal decisions reflecting the liberal arm of the Bazelon Court were opinions pertaining to the interplay between
criminal law and mental health law. These opinions, such as Rouse v. Cameron, 117 centered on the right to treatment for those subjected to the criminal
process. Rouse and other decisions coming out of the D.C. Circuit that were
112 MORRIS, supra note 52, at 194.
113 BANKS, supra note 52, at 12.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 The "story" of the Killough case is recounted in various opinions: United States v. Killough,
193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United
States v. Killough, 218 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1963); and Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
117 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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"favorable" to the right to treatment or alternative treatment for the accused or
incarcerated "provoked the claim that the D.C. Circuit was more interested in
pampering convicted felons than in punishing them."' 1 8 As criticisms of the D.C.
Circuit and its handling of criminal matters grew, and as voices on behalf of home
rule for the District of Columbia began to be heard, the Nixon Administration
seized the opportunity to remove significant jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases arising in the District of Columbia from the D.C. Circuit.
Using its constitutional Article I authority, the Congress of the United States
transformed the courts of lesser importance in the District of Columbia into a
new, much more powerful local court system, one expected to be less protective
of criminals. A trial court, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
emerged from a consolidation of three existing courts-the Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court, and the Tax Court-and an expansion of the jurisdiction of these consolidated courts. 119 In addition, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals was "disconnected" from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit by withdrawing the power of the D.C. Circuit to
review decisions of the DCCA. 120 The DCCA is now the "highest court" of the
District of Columbia, and although the District is not a state, the DCCA is considered to be "the highest court of a State" for purposes of Supreme Court review. Thus the final judgments and decrees of the DCCA are reviewable only by
the Supreme Court of the United States, consistent with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1257.121 Furthermore, even though limited home rule was conferred on
the District of Columbia in 1973, the judges of the D.C. Courts still must be nomi1 22
nated by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.
As Judge Mack took her seat on the DCCA, precedent-setting decisions still
were in process because of the newness of the court structure, the home rule
government and its policies, and the changing nature of society in general. One
of the first areas in which she would have an opportunity to make her mark
would be that relating to children and their welfare. Furthermore, her peaceful
beginning tenure on the DCCA soon would be interrupted by strong controversy.
Just as pointed and heated disagreements erupted in the Bazelon Court, so too
118 BANKS, supra note 52, at 17; see also MORRIS, supra note 52, at 221-22.
119 M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). The expansion of jurisdiction was phased in.
On August 1, 1972 the Superior Court was given jurisdiction over all criminal appeals under the D.C.
Code and on August 1, 1973, the remaining local civil jurisdiction and probate functions were assumed
by that court.
120 The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-358, 84 Stat. 432; see also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 393 n.2 (1973); M.A.P. v. Ryan,
285 A.2d 310, 311-12 (D.C. 1971); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
463-64 (1983); Thompson v. United States, 548 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
121 See Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59, 64 (1977); see also D.C. Code § 11-102 (2001).
122 D.C. Code § 11-1501 (2001).
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would a contentious atmosphere soon prevail in the Newman Court (headed by
Chief Judge Theodore Newman).
IV.

"WAS IT A LITTLE GIRL?" IN RE

R.M.G.

"Was it a little girl?" asked Judge Mack as she prepared to discuss In re
R.M. G. 123 with the author. In re R.M.G. stands as an important interracial adoption case. It was considered by the DCCA when controversy surrounded not
only the adoption of African American children by white parents, but also the
DCCA itself, as the DCCA's African American chief judge and four white members of the court, called the "Gang of Four," engaged in ugly disputes that spilled
into the public arena.
In re R.M.G. involved a little girl born to unmarried African American teenage parents. 124 For approximately three months or more, the teenage biological
parents struggled to care and provide for the little girl, with help from the father's
mother and stepfather. The biological father of the little girl reportedly left the
District of Columbia before the child's birth and moved to Cleveland, Ohio.
Care of the little girl became increasingly difficult for the mother. Perhaps realizing that her child's care was inadequate, that the child's health was poor, and
fearing that she might be retarded, the mother approached the District of Columbia Department of Human Resources (DHR) (now the Department of Human
Services) in January 1978, with a request that the child be placed in foster care.
The mother advised neither the father nor his parents of her decision.
DHR placed the little girl with white foster parents who had four biological
children and an adopted black child. The foster father was a relatively high ranking military man, and the foster mother was a former member of the Peace
Corps. They discovered that the little girl had low body weight, was lethargic,
suffered from nausea and diarrhea, and revealed signs of mental retardation. The
foster parents nursed the little girl to good health and discovered that she was not
mentally retarded but quite intelligent. Once the little girl was in the care of the
white foster parents, the bonding process began. They soon expressed a desire to
adopt the little girl, and filed a petition for adoption in late April 1978.
Upon learning that the biological father had not been notified about the
mother's placement of the child with DHR, the foster parents insisted that notice
be sent to him. The biological father took the position that his mother and stepfather, the little girl's grandparents, should be allowed to adopt the child. Hence
a competing adoption petition was filed by the paternal grandparents. The
123 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
124 The background of this case is taken from record documents for DCCA appeal No. 79-747,
including the trial court's order of May 18, 1979, and the briefs and pleadings filed in the DCCA.
Unfortunately the transcripts of the hearing before the trial court could not be located, but the opinion summarizes some of that testimony.
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grandmother had remarried after the death of her first husband, and her fourteen-year-old child, the youngest, lived in the home, as well as two of the grandmother's grandchildren. Both grandparents worked but the grandmother voiced
a willingness to seek a leave of absence so she could take care of the little girl.
Faced with two competing petitions for adoption of the little girl, one from
middle class, stable white foster parents, and one from stable African American
grandparents of modest means, the trial judge sensed immediately the importance of the case. Before getting further into the case, we introduce the trial
judge, who was elevated from the Superior Court to the DCCA while this case
was pending.
A.

The Trial Judge

The Honorable William C. Pryor presided over In re R.M.G. A native Washingtonian, born in 1932, he was an only child whose mother worked in the government, was a high school graduate and had wanted at one time to become a
lawyer.1 25 His father, originally from Charlottesville, Virginia, had at most a second grade education. He worked for a time on the railroads before moving to
Washington, D.C. and a job with the local telephone company. He rose from a
position of janitor at the company to a manager's position. He manifested a
strong work ethic. After putting in his time at the telephone company, he painted
houses in the afternoon, and in the evening switched to his door to door salesman's job. On the weekends, he worked as a waiter at a country club.
With their strong work ethic, Bill Pryor's parents challenged him to excel in his
studies at Banneker Junior High School and during the year he spent at Dunbar
High School, both public schools. After hearing about the Northfield/Mount
Herman School in New England, and discovering that, at the time, one only paid
what one could afford for the education there, Bill Pryor's parents consented to
his transfer to Mount Herman. After completing his studies at Mount Herman,
Bill Pryor entered Dartmouth College, and later earned his law degree in 1959 at
the Georgetown University law school.
While he was enrolled at Georgetown, Bill Pryor was sent to the federal government's National Institutes of Health (NIH) for a summer internship. Instead
of giving this African American law student legal work, NIH used him as a messenger. The following two summers Georgetown sent him to the Department of
Justice where he came under the tutelage of attorney Harry Stein. Mr. Stein
helped Bill Pryor to hone his writing and research skills in the litigation area.
Upon his successful completion of the law school program at Georgetown, Bill
Pryor started work as a law clerk in the Department of Justice and soon was
selected for the Attorney General's Honor Program. Again, he was placed with
125 The biographical information in this section is based primarily on the author's interview
with Judge Pryor on May 7, 2003, in Washington, D.C.
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Mr. Stein. Bill Pryor found the litigation cases to which he was assigned both
exciting and rewarding. Of particular help was Mr. Stein's insistence that, despite
Bill Pryor's youthful excitement about an assignment, he slow down and concentrate sufficiently to understand the precise issue before him. He would force Bill
Pryor to articulate the precise issue requiring attention because, as Mr.12 Stein
put
6
it, if Bill Pryor "couldn't verbalize it, then [he] didn't understand it."
While Bill Pryor was at Justice, Mr. Stein encouraged him to expand his horizons. Around that time, Robert Kennedy was the Attorney General of the
United States, and he held Saturday morning informal meetings with attorneys at
Justice. Judge Pryor described sitting on the floor in a big room while Robert
Kennedy asked those present, "What are you doing? What would you like to
do?" When those questions were posed to Bill Pryor, he told Robert Kennedy
that he would "like to see what it's like in court," that he did "a lot of things for
the Assistant United States Attorneys, but rarely [did he] get to court." The
following Monday, after this exchange with Robert Kennedy, Bill Pryor was
"temporarily
assigned to go over and work on civil matters at the U.S. Attorney's
7
office."

12

Bill Pryor was given a warm welcome at the U.S. Attorney's office and was
assigned to criminal misdemeanors. The United States Attorney at the time was
Oliver Gasch. Prior to being nominated for the federal bench, Oliver Gasch
completed paperwork to make Bill Pryor an Assistant United States Attorney.
As Judge Pryor put it, the United States Attorney's office then "became [his]
life," and he "learned the craft of what [one does] as a lawyer from ground up."
He rose to the position of Deputy Chief, Court of General Sessions Branch, and
then became Chief of the Grand Jury section.
After serving in the U.S. Attorney's office for a number of years, Bill Pryor
accepted a position with the Bell Telephone System in 1964, a move that stirred
great pride in his father. But Bill Pryor was "restless," and missed the courthouse. He did not particularly enjoy rate making, the bread and butter duties of
attorneys in the Bell System's legal division. One day, the General Counsel of
the local Bell alerted him that he would receive a telephone call from Ramsey
Clark of the Justice Department. When Bill Pryor met with Ramsey Clark, he
was asked to return to the Grand Jury section of the U.S. Attorney's office. Bill
Pryor puzzled over the assignment, in November 1967, to a position he had held
previously, but the assignment was intentional and planned by forces having a say
in the selection of District of Columbia judges.
Fortuitously, Bill Pryor's father-in-law, Mr. Bruce, worked as a doorman at the
White House, and had constant contact with the President, since he had "to move
the President around the White House campus." While he was escorting the
126
127

Author's interview with Judge Pryor in Washington, D.C. (May 7, 2003).
Id.
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President one morning, President Lyndon B. Johnson handed him a list of names
and inquired whether he knew anyone on the list. The President explained that
selections soon would be made for judgeships on the District of Columbia Court
of General Sessions. When Mr. Bruce told the President he knew one name, and
identified Bill Pryor, and told the President about him and the relationship between the two, the President insisted that Mr. Bruce tell no one, including his
daughter, about their discussion. The President, however, allowed Mr. Bruce to
alert Bill Pryor. So, the plan in returning Bill Pryor to his old position in the U.S.
Attorney's office was to position him for the appointment to the Court of General Sessions. An appointment from the U.S. Attorney's office, rather than the
Bell Telephone Systems, was deemed more appropriate. President Johnson nominated Bill Pryor to the Court of General Sessions on February 23, 1968. He was
confirmed by the Senate on March 11, 1968, and took the oath of office on March
21, 1968. When the Court Reform Act of 1970 took effect, Judge Pryor became a
Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. At the time of In re
R.M.G., he was assigned to handle family division matters.
B.

Judge Pryor Tackles In re R.M.G.

Judge Pryor undoubtedly approached In re R.M.G. as he had been trained to
do by Mr. Stein. He knew immediately its importance, and the ultimate focus of
the case. As he told this author:
In trying the case, I could tell almost early on, this is unusual because we
had a psychiatrist, Frances Welsing ....
And we had this unusual mix of
parties. We had a military family, [including] a lady who had been in the
Peace Corps, wanting to adopt this young girl ... of color. And we had
blood relatives. We had a father who was not a large presence in the caseonly really the grandmother who sought to adopt the child on behalf of her
son-sort of a sketchy group of people over there because they weren't all
present. And, you had the social agency. My input became that from the
people who sought to adopt the child-non-blood relatives and the grandmother, the social agency and the medical people who were giving their
opinions about it. I recognized that we [had] a new issue here: How do you
12 8
do adoptions when you have this particular issue of ethnicity?
Judge Pryor recalled that the foster father "was a clean cut, wholesome man who
wanted to [adopt the little girl], but the [foster] mother was the prime mover.
She was the one whose idea it was to adopt." The foster father confirmed that his
wife wanted "very much" to adopt the child, and that he was "very supportive of
it." The foster mother "was very emotional and dedicated to this [little girl], and
did not want to lose her." When the grandmother testified, she reminded Judge
128

Id.
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Pryor of his own grandmother, and other grandmothers like her. She was a "very
stable woman" and even though her contact with the little girl was limited due to
the child's foster care placement, the grandmother was firm in her statement that
whatever was hers also belonged to the little girl.
Judge Pryor viewed the District's social agency as neutral, or as Judge Pryor
put it, the agency "did sort of a 50-50 presentation in that they could see good
points on either side of the case.",1 2 9 Furthermore,
[t]hey said, as far as they could determine, there was care and devotion to
the child. It was not something casual. On the other hand, they said that
the grandmother was the salt-of-the-earth type of person and would extend
her every resource to this grandchild, although she had limited resources.
And she was a woman, at that time, of advancing years ....She was probably in her late fifties or early sixties. So I didn't see her as having a very
short life span. The social agency kind of left it at that. They didn't purport
to say which one of these would be best. They kind of let that fall to me. I
worked very hard on that question, as you can imagine, and came to the
conclusion that when you looked at past, present and future, this young
child would do well to have the guiding hand of people like her grandmother as she approached life.
The hearing on the adoption petitions covered a three-day period, from April
27-29, 1979. In addition to the foster parents and the little girl's paternal grandmother and her husband, the trial court heard testimony from Dr. Robert
Ganter, a child psychiatrist; Doris Kirksey, a social worker assigned to the case of
R.M.G.; and Dr. Frances Welsing, also a child psychiatrist.130 Dr. Ganter contrasted the little girl's condition at the beginning of her placement with the foster
parents to her mental and physical status at the time of the hearing. Instead of a
sick child who manifested symptoms of mental retardation, the little girl was in
very good health, had "bloomed enormously" and evidenced "high average to
above average intelligence." Although the trial judge recalled the social agency
taking a neutral stance in terms of which petition for adoption should be approved, Ms. Kirskey articulated a recommendation in favor of placement with the
grandparents "based on the premise that the best place for a child is . . . with
blood relatives." She expressed the view that the little girl would not suffer any
harm upon her removal from the home of the foster parents. The recommendation resulted in part from the views of Dr. Welsing.
129 Id.
130 Since the transcripts of the hearing could not be located, the summary of the testimony is
based upon the statement of facts found in DCCA's opinion in the case. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776,
780-81 (D.C. 1982). Dr. F. Jay Cooper testified on behalf of the foster parents. Apparently his testimony focused on the adoption factors to be considered by the trial court.
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Perhaps the most provocative testimony at the hearing came from Dr. Welsing,
who was known then for strong positions on behalf of the African American
community. Indeed, her views mirrored those of black social workers in the early
decade of the 1970s. Dr. Joyce Ladner, a sociologist/educator, reported that "[i]n
1971 she heard the first organized rumblings against [transracial] adoptions by
black social workers. They bitterly criticized adoption agencies for not recruiting
black parents and seriously questioned the ability of white people to rear black
children." 131 The rumblings grew to the statement of a clear opposition to interracial adoptions. At its annual meeting in 1972, the National Association of
Black Social Workers (NABSW) adopted a resolution condemning transracial
adoptions which read in part:
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster
care or for adoption. Black children belong physically, psychologically and
culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total sense of
themselves and develop a sound projection of their future. Human beings
are products of their environment and develop their sense of values, attitudes and self concept within their family structures. Black children in
white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves as
132
Black people.
While these were strong words, even stronger opposition was registered by the
black social workers. They perceived interracial adoptions as "cultural genocide."' 133 They appeared most concerned about identity issues that would confront a child adopted by white families. As NASBW explained:
Identity grows on the three levels of all human development, the physical,
psychological and cultural and the nurturing of the self identity is a prime
function of the family. The incongruence of a white family performing this
function for a black child is easily recognized. The physical factor stands to
1 34
maintain that Child's difference from the family.
Perhaps the strong NABSW position statement grew out of an increasing trend to
place black children with white families. Professor Kennedy noted that because
of the number of "parentless black children" in the decade of the 1960s, there
was a concerted push by social workers and others to place black children in any
home that would accept them. The thrust to find adoptive families for these chil131
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133

RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,

452 (2003).
134 LADNER, supra note 131, at 78.

TION

IDENTITY, AND ADOP-

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

dren resulted in thirty-five percent of them being placed with white families in
1971.135
Although Judge Pryor was aware of Dr. Welsing before she became a witness
in the R.M.G. case, he did not know "her reputation." As he stated:
I soon began to assess her as she testified in the court. I knew she was a
leading thinker in the community. She was very aggressive in the court,
very. She said things that were provocative and somewhat hostile about the
reasons why this family would want to adopt this child. It turned out that
they had already adopted one child of color. She said the reason for wanting to adopt a second child was simply to give this person a playmate. Then
she began to talk about the history and the conceptual things about interracial adoptions. That was very sound information she was giving us but at
the same time there were these underlying fires that she was also 136
giving us.
professional.
informed
an
much
very
and
thorough
very
was
She
Although Dr. Welsing did not cite from scholars and journals during her testimony, she would say, "it's well known and then she would give an example." For
example, Dr. Welsing declared:
It's well known.., that if we take this young person of color and put [her]
in a different cultural environment, who knows what her adjustment will be
ten years down the road, fifteen years when she becomes dating age-all
the things that young women go through? [T]hat's for you to consider.
13 7
[T]here's a lot of writing about it.
After hearing the testimony presented, Judge Pryor focused on "the best interests of the child," as the paramount concern. 138 He viewed the case as requiring
an assessment of "customary" factors in an adoption case, with the one difference
being the addition of "ethnicity or race." which he described to the author as "a
new thing to be considered along with all the other [factors].",139 The seven statutory factors considered by Judge Pryor were:
1. The age of the child.
2. The stability of the adopting family and the reasons for seeking an
adoption.
3. Financial and other resources available to the adopting family.
4. Existence of love and affection between the persons involved.
135 "In 1968, of 3,122 black children placed for adoption nationally, 733-or 23 percent-were
placed in white homes; in 1971 the figure was 2,574 out of 7,420 or nearly 35 percent." KENNEDY,
supra note 133, at 452.
136 Author's interview with Judge Pryor in Washington, D.C. (May 3, 2003).
137 Id. Judge Pryor stated that after hearing Dr. Welsing's testimony, he read works on transracial adoptions.
138 In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 781 (D.C. 1982).
139 See supra note 136.
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5. Blood relationships, if any.
6. Race.
7. Any other significant factors.
Rather than examining these factors only from the perspective of the present day
situation, Judge Pryor thought it "equally important [to] weigh these factors in
140
terms of past, present and future."
The first two factors-"age of the child" and "stability of the adopting family
and reasons for seeking an adoption"-appeared to weigh in favor of the foster
parents, at least with respect to past and present. Judge Pryor wrote:
It is seen that the child is very young-less than two years old. In her young
life she has already undergone significant and probably traumatic changes.
According to expert testimony, these changes or shifts are permanently recorded by the mind. Similarly, it is agreed that sudden changes of the family setting or other vital parts of one's environment can cause uncertainty,
emotional distress and a sense of insecurity. Having regard for the history
of this case, it is predictable that another change in the life of this child will
cause some degree of injury or harm to her."'1
The next two factors-"financial and other resources available to the adopting
family" and "existence of love and affection between the parties involved"-appeared to be favorable to both the foster parents and the grandparents in the eyes
of Judge Pryor, although undoubtedly there was some disparity in income. "Both
families have shown love and concern for the child. Both families
are reasonably
142
stable-the [foster] family has greater financial resources.'
When viewed from a future compass, the factors of "blood relationships" and
"race" tipped the balance in favor of the grandparents. Judge Pryor did not consider "blood relationship" as a "conclusive" factor. Indeed, "in the absence of
love, affection, stability, and other supportive traits, blood relationship alone confers no special right of parenting."'1 4 3 But, he was not prepared to dismiss this
factor altogether. Rather, he determined that "the question [of blood relationship] should also be weighed in the interest of family tradition, culture and other
144
intangibles."'
C)
140 Author's interview with Judge Pryor in Washington, D.C. (May 7, 2003).
141 In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 781.
142 Id. The attorney for the grandparents, Benjamin F. Saulter, J.D., indicated that they were
working class people; that the grandmother was a cafeteria worker in the District of Columbia Public
Schools, and the grandfather may have been a maintenance worker. Interview with Benjamin F.
Saulter, J.D. in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 2004). In contrast, the foster father was in the military and
held the rank, at that time, of colonel.
143 See supra note 141, at 782.
144 Id.
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For Judge Pryor, culture undoubtedly had a tie to race, as did considerations of
the future, all within the context of "the best interests of the child." Thus, in the
last paragraph of his order, he focused on the limitations of the expert testimony,
and, implicitly, what the experiences of this little African American girl might be
considering her actual racial identity and her nurture in a white family setting:
The question of race is important. It is interesting that all the experts who
appeared in this matter agreed that not enough work has been done on the
subject as it pertains to adoption. However unpleasant, it would seem that
race is a problem which must be considered and should not be ignored or
minimized. Conversely, there are no conclusive absolutes to be drawn on
the basis of race. It would seem, however, entirely reasonable that as the
child grows older the ramifications of this problem would increase. At a
later stage, notwithstanding love and affection, severe questions of identity
arising from the adoption and race most probably would evolve. In the
world at large, as the circle of contacts and routines widens, there are countless adjustments which must be made. Given the total circumstances in this
case, the child's present status is relatively secure and carefree. The future,
in each of its stages-childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, etc.would likely accentuate these vulnerable points. The Court does not conclude such a family could not sustain itself. Rather the question is, is there
not a better alternative? The Court is concerned that little medical or scientific attention has been devoted to this problem. The Court is concerned
that, without fault, the [foster parents] stand to lose a beloved member of
their family. However, our test remains the best interest of the child. It is
believed that applying all of the factors to be considered, and evaluating the
question in terms of past, present and future, that the appropriate alternative is adoption of the child by the [paternal grandparents].14 5
Once Judge Pryor's order was released, the foster parents began a series of
procedural steps designed to delay and ultimately to reverse that order, as well as
the subsequent decree of adoption in favor of the paternal grandparents. They
also added an African American as lead counsel. The trial court entered an interlocutory decree of adoption on June 1, 1979, and after supplemental motions and
efforts to persuade0 the trial court to stay its order were denied, the foster parents
filed a notice of appeal on July 6, 1979. They also sought to stay the decree of
adoption favoring the paternal grandparents. Their motion for a stay, filed in the
DCCA on July 12, 1979, set the stage for later arguments regarding cross-racial
adoptions, the testimony of Dr. Welsing, and the absence of constitutional considerations by the trial court. A panel of three DCCA judges denied the motion to
stay the adoption order on August 21, 1979, and the foster parents lodged a peti145

Id. at 4.
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tion for rehearing en banc of that denial on September 4, 1979, continuing to
press their contentions regarding the cross-racial factor, Dr. Welsing's testimony,
and the constitutional dimension. 14 6 A temporary stay pending disposition of the
petition for rehearing en banc was granted.
Counsel for the grandparents, Benjamin Saulter, attempted to paint the case as
one involving a normal "adoption of a child by the child's biological grandparents
with the consent of the natural father; and the recommendation of the Department of Human Resources," in opposing the foster parents' petition for rehearing
en banc on October 23, 1979. But, in their reply memorandum of October 24,
1979, counsel for the foster parents, Bobby B. Stafford and Julian Karpoff, apparently for the first time in the case, articulated their argument concerning the alleged constitutional dimension of the case:
According to Constitutional theory, race is a suspect classification which
can only be permitted upon strict scrutiny and the finding of a compelling
state interest served thereby. Appellants contend on this appeal that no
such compelling state interest is presented in this1 case
and, in any event, no
47
such strict scrutiny was given by the trial Court.
Mr. Karpoff was deeply offended by the testimony of Dr. Welsing and found it
"outlandish and racist." By the time of the appeal, he was "running out of gas."
In addition, he believed that Dr. Welsing had "politicized" the case. So, he discussed the case with his long time friend, attorney Bobby Stafford, who became
"fascinated" by it and agreed to become part of the legal team for the foster
148
parents.
The petition for rehearing en banc was denied on August 11, 1980 by the full
court; 1 4 9 however, the order did not lift the temporary stay of the order that had
been granted on October 19, 1979. Nevertheless, counsel for the foster parents
sought to elevate the issue of the stay to the Supreme Court of the United States.
On September 10, 1980, they filed an application for a stay of the trial court's
adoption order pending review by the DCCA. In that application, accompanied
146 The petition for rehearing en banc of the denial of the motion to stay the adoption order
cited as "substantial questions for review" the following:
Whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial Court's deference to
the cross-racial aspect of the case; ....
Whether the trial court erred in barring [the foster parents'] counsel's examination of witness
Dr. Welsing regarding the progress made in integration and race relations in the United
States in the last 15 years, and related matters;
Whether the trial Court erred in not recognizing and addressing the Constitutional significance of its ruling.
147 Appellants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Petition for Rehearing In Banc on
Their Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Oct. 24, 1979, at 1.
148 Author's telephone interview with Julian Karpoff, J.D. (Feb. 3, 2004).
149 The order was issued on behalf of Chief Judge Newman and Associate Judges Kelly, Kern,
Gallagher, Nebeker, Harris, Mack, and Ferren.
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by their brief which also was filed in the DCCA on the same date, they made a
frontal attack on Dr. Frances L. Cress Welsing, describing her as a "racist" and
quoting from her article entitled, Cress Theory of Color-Confrontation. ° The
Supreme Court denied the stay application on September 16, 1980. However, the
DCCA never lifted its temporary stay throughout the protracted proceedings
before that court, and counsel for the grandparents filed no papers requesting
that it be vacated. Hence, the little girl never was removed from the home of the
foster parents, despite the trial court's order.
C.

The DCCA Panel of Judges

The panel drawn to consider the case of R.M.G. on appeal, ironically, was
composed of Chief Judge Theodore Newman and Judge Julia Cooper Mack, the
only African Americans on the court at the time, and Judge John Ferren. Like
Judge Mack, then Chief Judge Newman was born in the South-Birmingham,
Alabama-on July 5, 1934.151 His father was a preacher in the historic African
Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church, who was assigned to Tuskegee, Alabama
soon after his son's birth. Judge Newman attended public schools in Tuskegee
until the eleventh grade when he, like Judge Pryor, was sent to the Mount Herman School in Massachusetts. He was admitted to Brown University where he
concentrated on philosophy courses. Harvard Law School was his next educational step, and he received his law degree in 1958. His major interests were
constitutional law and litigation. Following his graduation from Harvard Law, he
served in the Judge Advocate's arm of the United States Air Force and was stationed in France.
After his military service, Judge Newman accepted a position in the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, but left after eleven months "because of some breaches of promises that had been made to [him] about assignments to a particular branch of the Civil Rights Division. 1 52 He entered private
practice with the historic firm of Houston, Bryant and Gardner. The Houston
name belonged to the venerable Charles Hamilton Houston who masterminded
150 While the Supreme Court application for a stay contained only two paragraphs from Dr.
Welsing's paper, the brief for the foster parents quoted several excerpts which explained the theory of
color confrontation, emphasizing the "numerical inadequacy" and "color inferiority" of Europeans in
the face of "the massive majority of the world's peoples all of whom possessed varying degrees of
color producing capacity"; indicating that "whites ... desire to have colored skin" as evidenced by
their actions during the Spring and Summer; that "Whites [regard] mass proximity to Blacks [as]
intolerable ... because the Blacks are inherently more than equal"; and that Whites have a "drive or
need to divide the massive majority of 'non-Whites' into fractional as well as frictional minorities."
Brief of Appellant at 11-12, 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
151 The biographical information on Judge Newman in this section is based primarily on the
author's December 18, 2002 interview with him in Washington, D.C.
152 Author's interview with Judge Newman in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 2002).
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many of the early civil rights cases and who died on April 22, 1950.153 William
Bryant subsequently was appointed to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Following his work with the Houston, Bryant & Gardner
law firm, Theodore Newman joined another firm that housed two men destined
to become judges, Carlisle Pratt and Shellie Bowers.
Judge Newman's elevation to the DCCA in 1976 was grounded in controversy.
A lifelong Republican and a man with a brilliant mind, Judge Newman had been
nominated to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia by President Nixon
in 1970. When a vacancy occurred on the DCCA, word began to filter out that
the Judicial Nomination Commission planned to designate an African American
as Chief Judge for the first time in the court's history, and that Judge Newman
would get the nod upon his nomination by President Gerald Ford, his confirmation by the Senate, and his investiture. Judge Newman informed the author that
he served for twelve days as an Associate Judge of the DCCA, instead of as Chief
Judge, because out of respect for the then Chief Judge of the Superior Court who
was up for re-designation, he did not wish to accept the Chief's position in the
DCCA until the re-designation of the Superior Court chief judge had been accomplished.1 54 Judge Newman "heard" that prior to his elevation to the DCCA,
incumbent judges decided to resist his designation as chief by "start[ing] a campaign to have a then sitting judge designated as chief prior to his selection and
confirmation." As he began his tenure as Chief Judge, he greeted controversy
which was to persist throughout his tenure as Chief Judge, and which reached a
crescendo in 1980, during the panel's consideration of In re R.M.G.
As the full court still was considering in early August 1980 whether to grant
the foster parents' petition for rehearing en banc of the three judge panel's denial
of their petition for a stay of the adoption petition, pending the completion of the
panel's work, Chief Judge Newman prepared for what inevitably would become a
contentious struggle for re-designation as Chief Judge of the DCCA, for a second
four-year term. In late 1980, the ugliness of the re-designation process spilled
into the press, as did leaks about the private conferences of the nine judges of the
DCCA. Benjamin Weiser of the Washington Post portrayed the reappointment
process as a "power struggle" pitting "[t]he feisty chain-smoking [Chief Judge]
Newman" against "Judge Frank Q. Nebeker, . . . a stern-faced former prosecutor
appointed to the court by [President] Richard M. Nixon in 1969, and the virtual
leader of the court before [Chief Judge] Newman arrived."' 55 Judge Nebeker, a
personable man, moved to the District of Columbia from Utah in 1953, and was
153 The life story of Charles Hamilton Houston has been detailed in a book by Professor
Genna Rae McNeil, a book she began as part of her doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago. GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
154 Author's interview with Judge Newman in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 2002).
155 Benjamin Weiser, Controversy at the Courthouse, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1980, at Al.
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given a job in the mail room at the White House.' 56 From that position he moved
to the Social Office of the White House "within a matter of a few months" to
become corresponding secretary for Mrs. Eisenhower. Simultaneously, he attended night law school at American University, graduating in 1956. Upon graduation, he was hired at the Department of Justice, Internal Security Division, to
work for Walter Yeagley, who would later become an appellate judge in the District's local system but who was then a confidential assistant to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division. Frank Nebeker was
transferred from the Department of Justice to the U.S. Attorney's office in 1958,
and worked first as a misdemeanor prosecutor and then as an appellate lawyer.
Subsequently, he accepted an opportunity to work in the Civil Division, but after
approximately one and one half or two years was designated Chief of the Appellate Division in the U.S. Attorney' office, a position he held for seven years prior
to his nomination to the appellate bench by President Nixon, and his confirmation and investiture in 1969.
Judge Nebeker depicted the DCCA as initially a "very quiet," "very conservative, non-fractious" court when he first joined the bench. The Washington Post
described him as "the power behind the court" who "worked diligently with
[Judge Stanley] Harris and other conservative judges to steer the court away from
the liberal rulings of the United States Court of Appeals which had governed the
District prior to 1970." 157 After the elevation of Chief Judge Newman, "the
court became quite polarized-liberal and conservative," from Judge Nebeker's
perspective.
The clash between Chief Judge Newman and what became known as "the
Gang of Four"-Judges Nebeker, Gallagher, Kern and Harris-may have intensified in June 1980 when the Clerk of the Court, Alexander Stevas, departed to
become a deputy clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. Chief Judge
Newman personally wanted to appoint the new clerk, but Judge Nebeker believed that all judges should have a say as to the person appointed. Thus "tug-ofwar" over the designation of a new clerk exacerbated interpersonal relations between Chief Judge Newman and some members of the court.
Interpersonal clashes and confrontations increased prior to Chief Judge Newman's re-designation. An angry Chief Judge Newman was reported to have
"slammed his fist on the table" in response to actions by Judge Gallagher and
abruptly ended a conference of the nine judges as he "stormed off to lunch. ' 158
And, a frustrated Judge Nebeker "tossed his pencil up against the court's sloping
bench in disgust, letting it roll back into his lap," as he and Chief Judge Newman
156 The biographical information on Judge Nebeker is based on the author's interview with him
in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2003).
157 Weiser, supra note 155.
158

Id.
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disagreed openly during an oral argument. 59 And, there were accusations that
Chief Judge Newman maneuvered to assign particular judges with a more liberal
to
bent, including himself, to write controversial opinions, including one relating
1 60
pretrial detention during the time In re R.M.G. was under consideration.
So irate were Judges Nebeker, Harris, Gallagher and Kern that they participated in a two-hour closed-door conference with the Judicial Nomination Commission, in opposition to Chief Judge Newman's re-designation as Chief. 161 The
Washington Post, which was not known for its support of Chief Judge Newman,
described the four judges as having made "a scathing denunciation of [Chief
Judge] Newman's judicial behavior and integrity." Judge Nebeker characterized
Chief Judge Newman's personality as "explosive" and complained that "independence and free exchange of views has almost disappeared behind closed doors."
Judge Kern reportedly added that Chief Judge Newman "has so impaired the
court's functioning by his actions and temperament that his colleagues are forced
to speak out publicly in order to save the court as an institution." When asked
about the reported statements of the four jurists opposing him, Chief Judge Newman stated: "It is inappropriate for me to comment on matters pending before
At least as to myself, I
the Commission since their proceedings are confidential.
162
intend to honor that obligation of confidentiality.
Joining Chief Judge Newman and Judge Mack as the final member of the
panel assigned to In re R.M.G. was erudite Judge John Ferren. He was born in
Kansas City, Missouri on July 21, 1937.163 He graduated in 1959 from Harvard
College with high honors and was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa. Three years
later, he received his law degree from Harvard Law School and joined a Chicago
law firm. He served as a member of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations from 1964-66. Soon, he turned to public interest law and advocacy, centering his attention on the delivery of legal services to the poor. He returned to
Harvard Law School and launched a program to train clinical law professors.
John Ferren's career in the District of Columbia began when he accepted a partnership at Hogan & Hartson, one of the District's finest law firms. He headed a
community services department whose mission focused on civil rights cases, as
well as poverty law and other types of public interest endeavors. In addition, he
held leadership positions on the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, from 1970-77, and the Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibility, Inc., from 1970-1980. He was nominated by President Jimmy
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 The biographical information on Judge Ferren is based on the author's interview with him
in Washington, D.C. on Apr. 30, 2003, and on an article in THE DAILY WASH. L. REP., Sept. 1, 1977,
at 1585, 1588.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Carter, confirmed by the Senate, and took the oath of office on September 6,
1977 as an Associate Judge of the DCCA.
Judge Ferren described his entry into the DCCA as "a time of enormous tension along largely ideological lines."'" "[A] number of cases" awaited his attention because of an en banc vote of 4-4. "[T]here were very strong personality
clashes." Contributing to the tension and personality clashes was the dynamic of
Chief Judge Newman's re-designation process. This was the setting in which In re
R.M.G. unfolded as the panel prepared to review the briefs and record of the
case, and to hear oral argument.
D.

The Briefs

The foster parents resumed their efforts to lift up constitutional equal protection as the overriding aspect of the case. They argued that the little girl had
"acquire[d] an independent cultural adaptation and socialization within a particu165
lar family . . . which cannot be sacrificed to a skin color racial classification.
Thus, the little girl's "cultural adaptation" into the family of her white foster parents trumped her African American heritage. As the attorneys for the foster
parents phrased it:
[T]he fundamental question posed is what is "Blackness" and what role, if
any, do genetic ties play? Is a child who is acclimated to one culture to be
earmarked to another because that was the culture of his forbearers?1 Partic66
ularly, should such an earmarking be upon the basis of skin color?
They maintained that the trial court had "maximized race as a relevant consideration." Moreover, they accused the grandparents of a two-year lack of interest in
the little girl, perhaps ignoring the fact that the biological mother neglected to
inform the biological father and his parents that she had placed the child in foster
care. Significantly, the foster parents argued, in essence, that removal of the child
from their home would be disruptive:
The result, as the decision stands, is the disruption of the child's identity and
socialization in blind honor of skin color, or at best, biological identity. To
serve such an atavistic notion, the trial court avowedly risks separation
trauma and jeopardizes all else.16 7 . . . The failure for the trial court to
weigh the child's cultural adaptation and the likelihood that the child would
suffer too much trauma if her home life were disturbed was a denial of [the
164
165
166
167

Author's interview with Judge John Ferren in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 30, 2003).
Appellant's Brief, at 5, 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 6.
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foster parents'] and the child's Constitutional rights under the Equal Protection doctrine of the Fifth Amendment.16 8
While conceding that "a compelling state interest may be cultural identification," the foster parents insisted that "skin color" could not be a compelling interest, thus attempting to single out "skin color" as the impermissible classification
in this case. Finally, the foster parents attacked the trial court's "finding" with
respect to race, calling it "the leading factor in the trial court's decision," and
contending that the "finding" was based on "unsupported generalities" and
"mere speculation '' 169 The foster parents then zeroed in on Dr. Welsing's testimony and her Cress Theory of Color-Confrontation.They even suggested in their
text and accompanying footnote that perhaps the little girl was not Black:
[A]re all Afro-Americans to be regarded and grouped as Blacks, and placed
[for adoption] on such a basis?
The subject child is, incidentally, light-skinned, as demonstrated in the photographs admitted as exhibits .... If all children with the slightest hinge of
color are to be regarded as Blacks, the result is a fitting, if unintended trib170
ute to Jim Crow.
Then, relying on the testimony of their experts, Dr. F. Jay Pepper and Dr.
Robert Ganter and their review of pertinent literature on cross-racial adoptions,
the foster parents asserted that "no authorities appear which favor biological ties
and the literature of cross-racial adoptions, though permeated by ideological
tracks, gives authority for the proposition that cross-racial adoptions were an accepted and acceptable practice. '17 1 Moreover, when the concepts of "attachment
and separation" are applied to the little girl's situation, "separating [her] from
' 172
one family to another at this juncture would result in serious consequences."
To highlight the danger of separating the child from the foster parents, they
quoted from a treatise titled Beyond the Best Interest of the Child173 stressing,
inter alia, that "[cihange of the caretaking person for infants and toddlers further
affects the course of their emotional development." Finally, the foster parents
reduced the importance of the "blood relation[ship]" factor, arguing that it
"pales upon scrutiny" and that "continuity and security of environment, not biol174
ogy, are the substance of the parental gift."
168
169
170
171
172
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The attorney for the grandparents defended the trial court's decision and reviewed the statutory factors to be applied in an adoption case. In particular, the
grandparents pointed out that "[a]t the time of the adoption hearing, the [little
girl] was just under two years old," and that "the trial court determined that the
child was young enough to be moved from one family to another," although with
difficulty. 175 In his interview with the author, Mr. Saulter, attorney for the grandparents, revealed his deep concern about the delay in the appellate process, since
as time passed, the reluctance to remove the little girl from the home of the foster
parents would increase. Indeed, by the time the appellate court decision was
released, the little girl had passed her fifth birthday. The grandparents emphasized their blood relationship with the little girl and her racial identity compared
with that of the foster parents, but they denied that the trial court "base[d] its
decision solely on race." 17 6 They also highlighted the trial court's examination of
the best interests of the child in the context of "past, present and future." They
pointed out that, while the Department of Human Resources found both the foster parents and grandparents to be an "appropriate family" for adoption, they
"further determined [the grandparents] to be the better choice of the two families
to adopt the child," a fact that the trial court "did not mention," but nevertheless
"surely" viewed as "an important consideration., 177 Contrary to the foster parent's argument that the natural father and his family expressed no interest in the
little girl for a two-year period, the grandparents maintained that he "acknowledged the child, [and] provided support for his child.' 7 8 There was no abuse of
discretion, the grandparents argued, because the trial court provided a "sufficient
rationale" in writing to satisfy the requirements of law in that it specifically "felt
that the child's development through the various stages of childhood, adolescence
and young adulthood would best be served by being with its natural family."
That decision "was based on reasoning, not caprice," in the grandparents'
view.

179

Finally, in the last section of their brief, the grandparents turned to the issue of
race, which the foster parents made the center piece of their brief. Their brief
provided no answer to the constitutional argument of the foster parents and indeed discussed no constitutional law cases or equal protection principles. Rather,
the grandparents emphasized that District law permitted consideration of race,
and indeed required the adoption petition to provide information concerning
race, religion, and relationship. Thus, "[w]hile race alone can not be the determining factor in granting an adoption; race is a factor the trial court is permitted
175
176
177
178
179
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to consider."' 80 Here, the trial court found both families fit to adopt the little girl
and, in its discretion, granted the petition of the grandparents. They argued that
exercise of that discretion did not rise to the level of abuse, and even if others
would have reached a different conclusion, the trial court's discretion should not
be disturbed. 18 1
The tape of the January 29, 1981, oral argument in this case cannot be retrieved. However, from appellant's post argument memorandum, it is possible to
discern clues as to the focus of that argument. 182 Apparently at least two lines of
questions emerged during the oral argument. One focused on whether the trial
court's judgment could be reversed if it was not "clearly wrong"; that is, if its
factual findings did not meet the plainly or clearly erroneous standard. The foster parents again insisted that the trial court's decision was based on sheer speculation and "the ramblings of Dr. Welsing.' 183 The other line of questions
apparently explored whether a presumption could be applied based on race. The
foster parents were quick to articulate this issue on their own terms: "Whether a
presumption in favor of racial matching in adoptions is good State and/or Constitutional law," and "[i]s racial matching such a compelling state interest as to justify even a presumption of law in that regard, it being acknowledged, presumably,
184
that an absolute rule is Constitutionally infirm?'
E.

The Panel's Deliberations and Opinions

Just as tensions in the DCCA generally were high over the re-designation of
Judge Newman as Chief Judge, they bubbled rather vigorously as In re R.M.G.
wound its way slowly through the DCCA process. Judge Ferren felt the discomfort first at the level of the en banc court when, after a panel including Judge
Ferren had denied the stay, the full court imposed one on the trial court's order
of adoption, which was never lifted during the pendency of the case. As Judge
Ferren commented during his interview with the author:
[F]or reasons that I will never understand, the en banc court granted a stay
which no party ever moved to lift . .
for some reason a majority of the
court [took that action] and it made me very uncomfortable, just because I
185
wanted to keep things moving.
He mused that the full court may not have wanted to separate the little girl from
the foster parents, because of the passage of time:
180
181
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I think there was a sense that this child by this time had bonded with the
foster parents and it shouldn't be a ping pong game. And I guess that's
right, but the problem was we never really went en banc, so I assume the
child stayed with the adopting parents and that was the end of it. There is
something that feels very, very strange and unfair and inappropriate about
all this. I think the system failed the case, failed the child, failed everybody.
The second point of discomfort for Judge Ferren arose during the panel's deliberations. By this time Judge Pryor was a member of the DCCA, which undoubtedly added to the discomfort. Judge Ferren experienced discomfort also
not only because he felt wedged between two African American judges in disagreement, but also because of his perception that Chief Judge Newman was
overly harsh with Judge Mack. As he stated:
The conference among the judges was not comfortable because, quite honestly, here I was, not an African American, involved in a case where my two
panel members were in sharp disagreement over the decision of still another colleague on our court from his trial judge days. And it was particularly uncomfortable because Judge Newman was quite harsh in his criticism
of Judge Mack, feeling that she had no business coming out that way [i.e.,
favoring reversal and remand]. In fact,... I felt that in a way he was harder
on her than he was on me, although he thought I was totally wrong.
In attempting to pinpoint the reasons for the disagreement between Chief
Judge Newman and Judge Mack, Judge Ferren posited a generational difference
regarding two opposite views: one favoring racial integration, the other incorporating aspects of the Black Power doctrine:
I sense, and this is gratuitous, and it may be wrong, but I sensed there was a
generational difference between two African American colleagues on how
they viewed race as applied in situations like this in the early eighties.
Judge Mack had always struck me as very strongly for racial integration,
and she was, while not color blind, one whose ideal was a racially integrated
community. She was [a] very charitable, very open, very caring, very fairminded person. I think Judge Newman at the time, oh, I guess kind of coming out of his generation, which is mine, really, had more of a Black Power
mentality at the time, if we can use the old sixties expression. And, so I
think he was more predisposed to at least emotionally agree with Dr.
Welsing. Whether he actually did or not, I don't know, but I could just
sense that there was a difference of viewpoint that made me very uncomfortable because I couldn't speak to either in quite the way they could and
the conference [was] not [a] happy occasion because I think there was a lot
1 86
of emotion going on.

186

Id.
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If what Judge Ferren perceived as the "harshness" of Chief Judge Newman
toward Judge Mack was designed to intimidate her or to persuade her to his
views, it was for naught. For Judge Mack is the consummate independent thinker,
shaped by a heritage of independent, self-sufficient Free Negroes, and by her own
life's experiences, whether professional or personal. Judge Ferren recognized her
strong independent stance on issues. "Judge Mack of all my colleagues was not
one that I ever saw knuckle under to anybody for any reason. 1I87think she is a
totally principled person who comes down as she comes down."

Judge Newman acknowledged his strong disagreement with Judge Mack about
In re R.M.G., saying: "I think you found a case that Judge Mack and I probably
1 88
disagreed most intensely about. And it's interesting because it is about race.,
Chief Judge Newman was surprised by Judge Mack's position in favor of reversal
and remand and her explicit view on the use of race in adoption proceedings. He
stated:
Judge Ferren never quite understood what Judge Mack and I were disagreeing about. This is one where I would have, in the normal course of things,
expected her to be fully in accord with the view I was [espousing]. I was a
bit surprised that she wasn't. Perhaps I just didn't understand the subtleties
1 89
of her position.
Under the DCCA practice of pre-assigning one member of the panel to write
the opinion for the court, Judge Ferren drew the writing chore for In re R.M.G.
His duty, as he recognized, was to forge a majority, or to pass the assignment on
to judges in the majority. Judge Ferren and Chief Judge Newman locked horns
on the constitutional issue; therefore, they were destined to disagree not only
about the outcome of the case, but also about its rationale. Interestingly, both
judges at the outset began with the proposition that the trial judge should be
affirmed. Judge Ferren's "initial instincts" were to "defer to the trial judge"; he
"had a high regard for Judge Pryor [and] was comforted to know that [he] was
[assigned to the case]." Moreover, as he pondered the case, Judge Ferren wondered: "How can constitutional considerations impact what is the best interest of
the child?" He realized that "not only is race a factor in the statute, but it is a
factor in common sense." Therefore, "it seemed to [Judge Ferren] that it defied
any kind of common sense" to say that the Constitution somehow as a document
would interdict a trial judge's findings.
As a former trial judge, Chief Judge Newman plainly favored the principle of
deference to the trial judge. And the presence of Judge Pryor as the trial judge in
In re R.M.G. appeared to have added significance for him. As the two-year period of analysis of the case unfolded, Judge Ferren moved away from his initial
187
188
189

Id.
Author's interview with Judge Newman in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 2002).
Id.
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instincts in favor of deference to the trial judge, while Chief Judge Newman ad-

hered to his original course, albeit within the context of the constitutional issue.
Judge Ferren wrestled more with that issue and the application of equal protection principles to the case. But, Chief Judge Newman never deviated from his

view that "race is a permissible factor" in adoption proceedings. For him, race "is
a fact of life." He elaborated:

We are not talking about whether or not a child should stay in foster care as
distinguished from adoption by a couple of another race. That's an easy

call. We're talking about where there are conflicting petitions for adoption,
[and] the other factors are reasonably in balance, is it legitimate to say this
child would be better off in a racial grouping of his or her own? There is
90

qualified expert testimony that tends to indicate that that is so.'

The analytical tension between Judge Ferren and Chief Judge Newman, which
1 91
registered divergent views that could not be reconciled into a majority opinion,
190 Id.
191 In addressing the constitutional issue, Judge Ferren concluded that the use of race in an
adoption setting required strict scrutiny. Judge Newman disagreed, and declared that only intermediate scrutiny was required because the consideration of race in In re R.M. G. was benign, not invidious.
Under Judge Ferren's strict scrutiny analysis the use of race, "an inherently suspect, indeed presumptively invalid, racial classification in an adoption statute is, in a constitutional sense, necessary to
advance a compelling governmental interest: the best interest of the child." 454 A.2d at 788. However, when applied in an adoption setting, race must be "precisely enough tailored to the child's best
interest to survive strict scrutiny .... " Id. Otherwise, invidious discrimination may occur. But, for
Judge Newman, "the appropriate level of scrutiny [was] not determinative in this case, since the consideration of race is necessary to the achievement of a compelling government interest and thus comports with equal protection even under the strict scrutiny standard." Id. at 801. Race consciousness is
permissible in an adoption setting, asserted Judge Newman, because of "future hardships to the child
when the parents are of a different race." and the "risks of interracial adoption," including a negative
impact on the child's identity. Id. at 802.
Chief Judge Newman and Judge Ferren reached different conclusions after analyzing the trial
court's decision. Judge Ferren identified "evidence" as a key ingredient concerning whether race may
be a relevant factor in an adoption setting: "If race is to be a relevant factor, the court cannot properly
weight it, either automatically or presumptively-i.e., without regard to evidence-for or against
cross-racial adoption. To do so would add a racially discriminatory policy to evaluation of the child's
best interest." Id. at 787. He regarded "parental attitudes" as significant, and "[blecause race may be
highly relevant to these parental attitudes . . . it is relevant to the larger issue of the child's best
interest." Id. Therefore under these circumstances race may enable the trial court and other interested parties "to focus adequately on the child's sense of identity, and thus on the child's best interest." Id. at 787-88. In applying the race factor to R.M.G.'s case, Judge Ferren thought that "the trial
court's reasoning was [not] sufficiently 'substantial,' [that is], based on a 'firm foundation of record' to
withstand scrutiny." Id. at 791. Judge Ferren questioned whether the trial court "properly analyzed
the racial issue." Id. He then constructed a three-step analysis that the trial court should have followed in examining the race factor:
(1) how each family's race is likely to affect the child's development of a sense of identity,
including racial identity; (2) how the families compare in this regard; and (3) how significant
the racial differences between the families are when all the relevant factors are considered
together.

LEGACY AND LEGAL JOURNEY OF THE HON. JULIA COOPER MACK

349

meant that Judge Mack would be the deciding voice.' 92 While she voted in favor
of the disposition advocated by Judge Ferren, reversal and remand to the trial

court for further proceedings in the trial court, she joined neither the analysis of
Judge Ferren nor that of Chief Judge Newman. Rather her views are set forth in

her concurring opinion.
Judge Mack's characteristic independence is reflected in the first sentence of

her concurrence: "In joining the disposition ordered by Judge Ferren, I find it
necessary to say in my own words what is, and is not, in issue here." 193 She first
dispelled the notion that the adoption statute was unconstitutional on its face

because of a racial classification or an impermissible preference:
The Adoption Statute mentions race and religion only as factors to be sup-

plied along with other information in a petition for adoption. D.C. Code
1973, § 16-205. It does not require that the court give these factors any con-

sideration whatever; it only provides that the court, after consideration of
the petition and other evidence, may enter a decree when it is satisfied that
the adoptee is suitable for adoption, that the petitioner is fit and able to
provide a proper home and education, and that the adoption will be for the
Id. Judge Ferren acknowledged the "conscientious[ness] and thorough[ness] of the trial court" and its
proper treatment of "race as only one of several relevant considerations." Id. 792. Nevertheless, its
"analysis did not provide the reasoning and the detail necessary to assure a reviewing court that the
evaluation of race was precisely tailored to the best interest of the child." Id. at 794.
Judge Newman vigorously defended Judge Pryor's decision and his analysis as he reviewed every
aspect of the trial judge's decision. He also examined and critiqued then existing cross-racial adoption
studies. His constitutional scrutiny of the trial judge's analysis highlighted one of "the risks of interracial adoption," that is, "the child's development of identity." Id. at 802. These risks include the
child's perception that he or she may not be black, a conflict of loyalties between the child's biological
and adoptive cultures; the absence of survival skills essential for blacks; and racial slurs that may
become a problem for the adopted child. Id. at 802-03. The dissent regarded Judge Ferren's approach
to the race factor as "overly narrow." Id. at 803-06. Perhaps most distressing to Chief Judge Newman
was Judge Ferren's interpretation of an extensive DCCA opinion analyzing the proper exercise of
discretion by a trial judge, Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1979), an opinion which
Chief Judge Newman authored and carefully crafted. Judge Newman regarded the trial court's opinion in R.M.G.'s case "[a]n economical but clear explanation." Id. at 808. And, even under Judge
Ferren's three-step evaluation, Judge Pryor's decision was sound. Id. at 808-09. In the final analysis,
Judge Newman considered that the "other factors [were] in equipoise," and that in the face of such
equipoise, "the interracial factor may sway the result," and that is "permissible" in this limited context. Id. at 810.
192 Law review articles discussing or mentioning In re R.M.G. and related matters include: D.
Michael Reilly, Districtof Columbia Survey: ConstitutionalLaw: Race As a Factor in InterracialAdoptions, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022 (1983); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests
Test and the Cost of Discretion,29 J. FAMILY L. 51 (1990-91); Davidson M. Pattiz, Note: Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal Protection Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571 (1994); Nancy D. Polikoff,
Context and Common Sense: The Family Law Jurisprudenceof Julia Cooper Mack, 40 How. L. J. 443
(1997); Kate Nace Day, Judicial Voice: Judge Julia Cooper Mack and the Images of the Child, 40 How.
L J. 331 (1997).
193 454 A.2d at 794.
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best interest of the adoptee. [D.C. Code] § 16-309. We are thus not faced
with a statutory scheme separating persons solely on the basis of racial classifications (see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)), or an affirmative action program allegedly giving preference on the basis of racial classifications
(See Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
19 4
(1978)).'

U.S. 265

Having assured herself that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face,
Judge Mack politely but bluntly explained to her colleagues on the panel that the
constitutional issue dissipated into a non-issue.
[H]owever tempted one may be to re-argue interesting constitutional issues,
I may refrain from doing so. Instead I may agree, magnanimously, with
both of my colleagues that the statute is constitutional195and add, uncharitably, that I do not think their arguments are relevant.
Once having dispelled the notion that the adoption statute was unconstitutional
on its face, she turned to the application of a race factor in the context of the best
interests of the child standard.
Several years earlier, in 1978, Judge Mack, reflecting her independent spirit,
labored assiduously to persuade the full court to take the unusual step of considering en banc, before a panel opinion issued, a case involving a presumption in
favor of the mother in adoption settings. 196 That case, Bazemore v. District of
Columbia,197 involved another little girl born out of wedlock who initially lived
with her mother and maternal grandparents at the time of a custody struggle.
Subsequently, the biological mother surrendered custody of the child to the biological father who was residing in his parents' house, but three years later, the
trial court returned the child to the mother on the basis of a presumption favoring
custody by a child's natural mother.
Over a partial dissent by Judge Gallagher, with whom Judges Nebeker and
Harris joined, Judge Mack, writing for the majority of the en banc judges, addressed and found wanting in Bazemore the presumption favoring custody by the
mother. Such a presumption was not controlling in custody cases, not only because it is impermissible but also since, in the final analysis, the facts of the particular situation guide the determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
Judge Mack wrote in part:
194 Id. (emphasis in original).
195 Id. at 795.
196 While Judge Mack did not dwell on the tension attending the consideration of In re R.M.G.,
she recalled that she had "a hard time" in Bazemore, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1977) (en banc). She
thought that "some of the men [particularly Judge Gallagher] had no idea of the best interests of the
child." The three judge panel in Bazemore consisted of Chief Judge Newman, Judge Gallagher and
Judge Mack.
197 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978) (en banc).
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In the first place, a rule of law providing that a mother has the strongest
claim to the custody of her child obscures, and indeed may be inconsistent
with the basic tenet, overriding all others, that the best interest of the child
should control ....
Besides obscuring the basic issue in the case, the presumption is itself
obscure in its application ....
Finally, the presumption facilitates error in an arena in which there is
198
little room for error.
Ultimately, then, for Judge Mack the factual underpinning and the record evidence in a case represented crucial indicators of what would be in the best interests of the child. "Surely, it is not asking too much to demand that a court, in
making a determination as to the best interest of a child, make the determination
upon specific evidence relating to that child alone." 199 Hence, said Judge Mack,
"in a dispute between a natural mother and father over custody of their child, the
trial courts shall decide the delicate question of what is the child's best interests
solely by reference to the facts of the particular
case without resort to the crutch
200
of a presumption in favor of either party.
Judge Mack's approach in Bazemore carried over into her analysis of the
R.M.G. case. Just as "sex-based distinctions," such as sex-based presumptions
that the mother is the more suitable custodian for a child than the father are
impermissible, so too is a race-based distinction. Presumptions are anathema because "[a] presumption is nothing more than a guess based upon probabilities...
that.., have not been conclusively established. 20 1 As Judge Mack stated in her
concurrence in In re R.M.G.:
I think that reversal is required in this case because the trial court, unwittingly, employed the factor of race as an impermissible presumption. In
Bazemore .... [supra] we held that a presumption based upon the sex of a
parent has no place in custody proceedings. Similarly, I suggest, a presumption based solely upon the race of competing sets of would-be parents has
no place in adoption proceedings. In both instances the court is weighing
the best interest of a particular child-an interest in which the human factor
20 2
of love is paramount.
In concluding her short concurrence, Judge Mack cut through the constitutional argument, ignored the controversy surrounding Dr. Welsing's testimony,
and articulated what for her was the core issue, the best interest of the little girl:
198 Id. at 1382.
199 Id. at 1383.
200 Id.
201 454 A.2d at 795.
202 Id.
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For a custody or adoption proceeding, we are not concerned with the best
interest of children generally; we are concerned, rather, with the best interest of THE child. While my colleagues are quibbling about "strict scrutiny" and "intermediate scrutiny," a little girl is reaching school age under
the care of the only parents she has ever known. Because I agree with
Judge Ferren that a trial court faced with such a "Solomonic" task, must
affirmatively justify its judgment in every material respect, I would reverse
and remand for a particularized determination, taking into consideration
factors bearing uniquely upon this child's adjustment and development including the significance of giving "full recognition to a family unit already in
existence." See Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). For this purpose, at least, I would
downgrade the emphasis on race to the significance it
20 3
should deserve.
For Judge Mack, then, the formula for resolution of the little girl's adoption
case could not be found in the complex language of constitutional equal protection. Rather, resolution begins with the proposition that any presumption regarding race is impermissible. Once that legal principle is clear, an intense focus
on the child whose case is before the court is critical. Generalizations about all or
other children are not helpful. Moreover, in examining the particular facts of the
child's situation, trial judges should not forget that ultimately there is a human
factor that is paramount, and that is a demonstration of love for the child by
those who seek to adopt her.
In the end, the parties, as did Judge Mack in the appellate court, focused primarily on what was in the best interests of the little girl. Judge Pryor discerned
that "the parties had decided that so much time had elapsed, that during these
tender years children bond to particular people, that the grandmother and others
decided, 'Well, we'll leave her where she is."' But, the grandparents would have
visitation rights. Judge Newman related what he called "the unpublished sequel."
Since the foster parents had had the little girl for so long and had bonded with
her, upon remand the noted attorney Wiley Branton, who was the little girl's
guardian ad litem, worked out an arrangement whereby the natural relatives
would withdraw their petition in exchange for liberal visitation rights.
Attorney Karpoff, who represented the foster parents, provided the happy
ending. 2° 4 The "prominent lawyer" [Wiley Branton] who was asked to mediate
the matter arranged for the grandparents and the foster parents to meet at a halfway point. By that time, the foster parents had relocated to Georgia with the
little girl. Attorney Karpoff was present when the grandparents and the foster
parents met in Charlotte, North Carolina. They "found each other congenial."
The foster parents brought photographs of the little girl and "struck an agree203
204

Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes and parallel citations omitted).
Author's telephone interview with Attorney Karpoff (Feb. 3, 2004).
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ment" under which the grandparents would be able to maintain contact with the
child. The foster parents would send photographs to the grandparents, but never
again heard from them. Attorney Karpoff retains a picture of the little girl at age
seventeen, and received a wedding invitation "a few years ago." The "little girl,"
who as of 2004, would be twenty-six years old, married a "young fellow from
Georgia." Both husband and wife are college educated and have promising careers, according to Attorney Karpoff.2 05 Ironically, Judge Mack remembered
that "years later," her own daughter had a friend who "had run into the little girl"
and that friend remarked on "how grateful she was" with the ultimate resolution
of the case.
In an odd twist of irony, three years after the decision in In re R.M.G., Judge
Pryor became the writing judge in a similar case, In re D.LS.,2 °6 in which the trial
judge was faced with competing petitions for adoption from the white foster parents [later only the foster mother as a result of the divorce of the foster parents]
and the Guyanese grandmother. Judge Pryor "smiled quietly to [himself]" when
he reviewed the case history because it paralleled, in almost every respect, that in
In re R.M.G. The trial court had to consider competing petitions for adoption of
a six-year-old girl, daughter of a Guyanese mother-one from the maternal
grandmother, the other from white foster parents. When the biological mother
no longer could care for the child due to mental illness, the child ended up with
white foster parents who had four children of their own. With the biological father's consent, the maternal grandmother sought to adopt the child. The psychiatrist presented by the grandmother emphasized the child's "future needs for
cultural and racial support."2 0 7 The trial judge, as did Judge Pryor in R.M.G.,
recognized the "bonding between [the child and the foster mother] and 'that a
very good life had been provided for [her] in the care and custody of the [white
foster family]"' but nevertheless concluded that the child should be adopted by
the maternal grandmother because the child's "natural family . . .is better
equipped as living examples thereof to inject into the life of the adoptee the real
sense of her Guyanese/Latino heritage and culture .. ."208
Relying on Judge Mack's concurrence in In re R.M.G., and pointing out that
neither of the other members of the R.M.G. panel joined Judge Ferren's analysis,
Judge Pryor declared in part:
We decline to apply the three-step approach articulated by the lead opinion
in R.M. G.... because it represents, in our view, an unwarranted and unwise
205 Attorney Karpoff described the foster parents as the "biggest-hearted people that you
would ever want to meet." About a dozen foster children went through their home, and "others
admired them." Author's telephone interview with Attorney Karpoff (Feb. 3, 2004).
206 494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. 1985).
207 Id. at 1321.
208 Id. at 1321-22.
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intrusion into the trial court's exercise of discretion in inter-racial adoption
cases. The approach is unwarranted because there is no need to reach the
constitutional issue of equal protection in such cases.20 9
In short, Judge Pryor advocated a "flexible approach, which requires the trial
210
judge to carefully weigh all the factors bearing on the child's best interests.
This approach clearly was akin to Judge Mack's insistence that the best interests
of the child determination should be made on the "specific evidence relating to
[the] child [in question]." Interestingly, Judge Ferren who also was on the panel
in In re D.LS. did not recall the case when the author interviewed him. His concurring opinion in In re D.LS. reiterates his conviction that the three-step approach he advocated in In re R.M.G. should be applied where race is a relevant
factor.21 '
Our examination of In re R.M.G. demonstrates that Judge Mack was not influenced by the exterior political and socio-cultural world surrounding her where
controversy erupted in the 1970s about cross-racial adoptions, and black social
workers warned that adoption of black children by whites would result in cultural
genocide. Undoubtedly her deep concern for a vulnerable little girl, the struggles
of her ancestors and those of her own against racial discrimination, and perhaps
her experience in raising her own daughter led her down an independent path in
her review of In re R.M.G. That same independent spirit, immune from the effects of surrounding controversy and focused on the best interests of the child
before the court, may be seen in other cases involving children. For example, in a
case raising the issue as to whether a same-sex couple could adopt a child under
District law, In re M.M.D.,212 Senior Judge Mack agreed with Judge Ferren that
District law permitted petitions for adoption from both same-sex and oppositesex couples. She took the opportunity to comment on dissenting Judge John
Steadman's reliance on the Latin maxim of statutory construction: Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Said Judge Mack:
I write as one who, although never exposed to the scholarly exercise of
Latin, heartily embraces the importance of "a common-sense understanding
of human thought and expression" alluded to by our dissenting colleague.
Nevertheless, I differ with Judge Steadman's ultimate premise that, statutorily speaking, as to who may petition for adoption, the phrase "any person,"
209 Id. at 1326-27.
210 Id. at 1327. Attorney Karpoff expressed deep consternation that Judge Pryor actually wrote
the opinion for the court in In re D.I.S. He even wrote a short article to that effect, but it has never
been published. Author's telephone interview with Attorney Karpoff (Feb. 3, 2004).
211 Judge Ferren regarded In re D.LS. as a different case in that not only race but cultural
identity was involved, and because, among other things, the foster parents had separated; there were
indications of "discriminatory treatment" of the little girl, and the child could obtain support from
"her extended natural family." 494 A.2d at 1328.
212 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
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[in the applicable District code provision] means "one person" and that the
only "joint" adoption permitted thereunder is one by a married couple.2 13
In three difficult termination of parental rights (TPR) cases, Judge Mack revealed her understanding of the momentousness of such termination, and her
determination that every aspect of the child's case must be examined in detail by
the trial court before parental rights are cut off permanently. And the decision to
terminate must be based on clear and convincing evidence. Her independent approach to TPR cases may be seen in her dissent in In re TM.,2 14 a case in which a
mother had been incarcerated for drug offenses but was attempting to recover
from her substance abuse. Judge Mack wrote:
We can all agree that the disruption of any family unit is a heart-rendering
experience. However, the incidents attendant to such a disruption are necessarily unique. The court-imposed termination of the parent/child relationship is an extreme remedy that obviously has a significant lifelong
impact upon all parties. Therefore, the statutory criteria, established by
[the applicable District Code provision] should not be the subject of
wooden application. Relevant case law should be flexible and fact-specific.
We should not affirm the termination of the parent/child relationship where
a less drastic remedy is both available and feasible.21 5
Despite the grim scenario of a twelve-year-old child with a learning disability
who had been abandoned by his mother and abused by his father, Judge Mack
persuaded her two panel colleagues, Judges John Terry and John Steadman, not
to affirm a termination of the biological father's parental rights in In re A.B.E.,
564 A.2d 751 (D.C. 1989), because the time between the trial court's decision to
terminate all parental rights and the oral argument on the appeal revealed some
slim hope that the father would be able to exercise his parental functions. Judge
Mack did not delude herself about the chances that the father could function
consistently, but she was keenly aware of the low prospect of finding adoptive
parents for a learning disabled child. As she poignantly declared:
This is a melancholy and exceedingly delicate case, and we do not reach
today's judgment without searching reflection. Three years have now
passed since A.B.E.'s termination hearing, an enormous span in the lifetime
of a child. In that time, A.B.E. has grown from childhood to adolescence.
Our record does not reflect the intervening changes in the family situation,
mental and emotional needs, or attitudes toward his own family status and
future. In vacating this case and remanding it to the trial court, we therefore instruct the trial court to explore these developments and, upon consid213
214
215

Id. at 862.
665 A.2d 950, 957-58 (D.C. 1995).
Id.
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eration of any relevant changes in the status of this child or other interested
21 6
parties, to apply the law in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Judge Mack "balanc[ed] the minimal possibilities of adoptive placement

against the stabilizing influence, and the sense of identity, that some continuing
legal relationship with natural relatives may ultimately bring," and "conclude[d]
that termination would only cast A.B.E. further adrift. ' 217 The third TPR case
prompted a separate statement from Judge Mack as her colleagues Judges Terry

and Steadman joined to affirm the termination of parental rights of a mother
whose behavior toward her two children was "inappropriate and selfish." In In re
P.D. and D.D.21 s Judge Mack urged the en banc court to review the case and the
policy of permitting a guardian ad litem to terminate a parent's parental rights at
a time when the District was being urged by political forces to speed the TPR
process.21 9 Ignoring those forces, Judge Mack emphasized the constitutionally
protected right of natural parents to raise their own children and called TPR "the
' 220

coldest of acronyms.
Finally, in a neglect case, Judge Mack once again insisted that the government
carry its burden of proof, this time to "show that any failure of proper care [of a
child] was not due to the parents' lack of financial means." 221 Joined by her
colleague Chief Judge Annice Wagner, 222 and over the dissent of Judge Warren
King, Judge Mack reacted to the trial judge's comments in finding the children to
be neglected. Speaking to the lack of cleanliness in the home, the trial judge
pointed to the cleanliness that a bar of soap could bring to the home, but Judge
Mack applied a balancing test to reverse the trial court's judgment. As she put it:
216 In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d at 757-58.
217 Id.
218 664 A.2d 337, 339 (D.C. 1995).
219 See id. at 340-41.
220 Id. at 340.
221 In re T.G., 684 A.2d 786, 787 (D.C. 1996).
222 Annice M. Wagner became Chief Judge of the DCCA in June 1994, during Judge Mack's
tenure as a Senior Judge. She was appointed to the DCCA in 1990, after having served as an Associate Judge of the Superior Court beginning in June 1977, assuming the seat of Theodore Newman after
he was elevated to the DCCA. Chief Judge Wagner was born and reared in the District of Columbia,
and attended public schools, including Dunbar High School. She earned her B.A. and L.L.B. degrees
from Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. Following her return to the District of Columbia,
she practiced with the prestigious Houston and Gardner law firm until she was selected as the first
female General Counsel of the then federal National Capital Housing Authority. She then pioneered
as the first People's Counsel for the District of Columbia. The Office of People's Counsel was created
by Congress, and has as its mission the representation of the District's utility consumers in rate making proceedings before the District of Columbia Public Service commission. Chief Judge Wagner has
served as the head of the Conference of Chief Justices, an organization whose membership is composed of the chief judges or justices of state courts. She has taught in the Trial Advocacy workshop at
Harvard Law School. Her awards for judicial leadership are numerous. THE DAILY WASH. L. REP.,
June 17, 1994, at 1196.
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There is a point, however, when decision-makers may be called upon to
draw a balance between a bar of soap and love, and although we are loathe
to second-guess the trial court's findings on this score, we nevertheless feel
compelled to reverse the finding of neglect because of the failure of the
2 23
government to meet its burden of proof.
V.

"You

RAISED ME UP So I CAN STAND ON MOUNTAINS"

It is possible in this limited study to convey only a sense of Judge Julia Cooper
Mack, the remarkable descendant of Aaron Revels, Lewis Sheridan Leary, John
Anthony Copeland, Jr., Juliette Meimoriel, and Dallas Leary and Emily McCoy
Perry. In pondering her own historic struggles and achievements, while periodically looking back through the years, Judge Mack may have said to her historic
and heroic ancestors, in the words of a song popularized by young artist Josh
Groban, "You raised me up so I can stand on mountains." And though she has
stood on mountains as she successfully confronted one challenge after another on
roads not heretofore traversed by an African American woman, the key to understanding Judge Mack's journey as a jurist is not in the mountains she has
scaled. Rather, the key lies in the quiet battles she has waged in the trenches,
without losing control-sometimes relying on the power of her written word;
other times seeing what others have not seen; and on still other occasions recalling the significance of the Market House in Fayetteville, North Carolina, or the
struggles of Free Negroes for dignity, liberty, the right to earn a livelihood, and
the political control of one's own destiny.
Much remains to be said about Judge Mack's jurisprudence and her 400-odd
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. However, in these last few pages
we provide only a glimpse into a few of the other subject areas where Judge Mack
has demonstrated a quiet independent spirit shaped by her heritage and life's
experiences, while ignoring the whirlwinds of exterior political and socio-cultural
controversy surrounding the DCCA and its work.
Hers has been a distinct, sometimes lonely, but nonetheless firm voice for what
the executive and legislative branches of the District government may do within
the limits of the powers delegated by Congress, rather than what these branches
of government may not do. As she wrote in a dissenting opinion which advocated broad interpretation of the powers delegated by Congress to the District's
legislature under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution of the United
States: "Any restriction on broad authority should be read narrowly and no limi2 24
tations not expressly imposed by Congress should be inferred.,
223 In re T.G., 684 A.2d at 790.
224 District of Columbia v. The Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415 A.2d 1349,
1373 (D.C. 1980) (en banc) (Mack, J., dissenting). Judge Mack's dissent was joined by then Chief
Judge Newman and Judge Pryor. Earlier, Judge Mack was the lone voice dissenting in an en banc
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Judge Mack has scrutinized and safeguarded the procedural rights of criminal

detainees in such areas as pretrial detention and custodial interrogation. She has
examined allegations of racial discrimination in employment and housing; sexual
orientation discrimination with respect to tangible benefits provided by a private,
religiously-based university; and she has sought to ensure a forum where such
allegations could be heard and resolved. This last section of the thesis shifts our
attention, in a limited way, to two areas of Judge Mack's jurisprudence, in an

effort to test the thesis further-criminal procedural safeguards, and discrimination against those protected by the District of Columbia Human Rights Act.
A.

"Scrupulously Honored"

22 5
We focus first on Judge Mack's approach to criminal procedural safeguards.
In examining her jurisprudence in this area, one realizes immediately that she did
not sit on criminal cases as the government's judge, despite her extensive experience in the Department of Justice, Criminal Division, as an appellate attorney
responsible for handling cases in federal circuits and the Supreme Court of the

United States. Rather she sat as one steeped in federal criminal procedure and

the history of the Bazelon and Warren courts' analysis of constitutional criminal
procedural safeguards. She knew well the precedent of those courts, cases which
the government won and lost. But she brought a keen, critical perspective to that

precedent and insisted on the importance of factual context in drawing conclusions. This can be seen in her general approach to DCCA criminal cases, and in
her decisions relating to constitutional rights as interpreted in the case of Miranda v. Arizona,226 and pretrial detention.
With respect to her general approach to criminal and other cases, Judge Mack
clearly respected precedent throughout her career. As she said in her dissent as a
case involving the taxing power of the District of Columbia and Congress's prohibition-through the
Home Rule Act-on enactment by the Council of the District of Columbia of "'any tax on the whole
or any portion of the personal income, either directly or at the source . .. of any individual not a
resident of the District."' Bishop v. District of Columbia, 411 A.2d 997, 999 (D.C. 1980) (en banc)
(Mack, J., dissenting). She complained that the majority's interpretation of the Council's delegated
power under the Home Rule Act "deprive[d] the District of Columbia of revenue from the very
persons who are the most likely candidates to pay for doing business in the city, contrary to all principles of taxation .
I..."
Id. at 1003. She zealously tried to safeguard the limited legislative powers of
the District, but also spoke out against the denial of basic voting rights to the District's citizens,
arguing in one of her partial dissenting and concurring opinions "that the Framers never contemplated that Congress would be permitted to use cession to strip away the rights accorded all state
citizens by the Constitution, rights that 'attached to [District residents] irrevocably' when the District
was a part of the ceding states." Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 885 (D.C. 1985) (en banc).
225 Of necessity, our treatment of Judge Mack's opinions relating to criminal procedural safeguards is limited. For an article that examines Judge Mack's dissents in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment areas, see Cedric Merlin Powell, ConstitutionalRights, Due Process, and the Dissenting
Voice, 40 How. L.J. 399 (1997).
226 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Senior Judge relatively late in her career: "I do not-I could not-question the
soundness of this precedent [relating to a two-part test for the validity of a showup identification of a criminal suspect] as a general proposition, especially when
applied to post-conviction appeals." 227 Nevertheless, she firmly believed that the
facts of a case were key to determining whether and how a decision in a past case
applied to the matter under consideration. As she declared in her dissent in a
case involving speedy trial issues: "I understand the allure of the majority's nononsense analysis in this case, but to state the obvious, the longevity and/or application of any legal principle cannot be divorced entirely from facts." 2 28 Precedent should not be applied routinely without studied thought and a careful
analysis of the factual context of the case, and trial judges should be given an
opportunity to apply precedent correctly in light of the factual record compiled in
a case. As Judge Mack put it:
It is fascinating (and somewhat disquieting) to observe how, at the same
time, mesmerized deference to legal precedent can defy such precedent ....
I write this "purported" dissent because, in the posture of the instant case, I
am disturbed about the conflicting signals that we are giving trial judges
with regard to a "sequential" "two-prong test" . . . . [U]nder the factual
pattern of the record before us, I would not reverse, but remand the case to
the trial court in order that she might say the magic words, "I find that there
was 'undue suggestivity' in the identification procedure" (a conclusion
which I read the record as supporting), before re-entering her finding of
22 9
unreliability (which likewise is supported).
In addition to application of precedent within the context of the factual record,
Judge Mack's general approach to criminal cases required a careful determination as to whether a constitutional or a trial error standard should be applied in
deciding the disposition of the case after an error in the trial court proceedings
was detected. For example, in a case where the majority concluded that the admission of a government witness' juvenile record showing an adjudication for
murder, and cross-examination of that witness based on the juvenile adjudication,
would not have affected the outcome of the trial, Judge Mack questioned the
legal standard applied by the majority. 230 Her dissent emphasized the application of legal precedent to the specific facts of the case under review, and Judge
Mack used those facts to argue that the majority had applied the wrong legal
standard in disposing of the case. The proper legal standard was the higher constitutional one, rather than the lower standard governing trial court error:
227 United States v. [Rodney] Brown, 700 A.2d 760, 764 (D.C. 1997) (Mack, J., dissenting).
228 [Lawrence E.] Givens v. United States, 644 A.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C. 1994) (Mack, J.,
dissenting).
229 [Rodney] Brown, 700 A.2d at 764 (Mack, J., dissenting).
230 [Riley S.] Walls v. United States, 773 A.2d 424, 434 (D.C. 2001) (Mack, J., dissenting).
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Sometimes in the practice of criminal law, bizarre factual circumstances
make it very difficult to apply settled legal principles. In this murder case, I
am left with the disquieting thought that we are in no position to conclude
that the trial court's curtailment of the cross-examination of a pivotal government witness about his own juvenile adjudication for murder did not
result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ....
As to the facts, we know that in the year 1992, a young teenager ... was
shot to death. Appellant Walls was arrested for this murder in 1994. He
was tried in 1995 and again in 1996. Both trials resulted in hung juries. This
instant appeal is from a conviction obtained in 1997 ....
On this record, arguably, I find it difficult to conclude, in this appeal (by
Walls from a conviction of murder) that the error in curtailing the crossexamination of Bryan (the key witness against Walls), about his own adjudication for murder, was not one of constitutional magnitude ....
On the night when young Jesse Moore was murdered, this witness was no
stranger to murder; he had killed as a youngster. At the time, he was still
under court supervision for his juvenile murder conviction. He arrived on
the murder scene with Walls shortly before the shots rang out; he was the
only witness in a position to see who actually fired the gun. Indeed, he was,
by all accounts, a key witness. Had the jury known of this witness' juvenile
adjudication for murder, it is reasonable to assume that it would have put
the whole case in a "different light." As a single error, this curtailment,
when considered along with the fact that Bryan was no stranger to lying and
had every motive to curry favor with the respective jurisdictions of this area,
23 1
would undermine confidence in the verdict.
Judge Mack's general approach to criminal cases-application of precedent and
the correct legal standard for disposing of the case to the factual setting of the
case-often left her at odds with her colleagues, or prompted them to join in her
majority opinion.
A few examples evidence Judge Mack's commitment to the constitutional protections articulated in Miranda. When the government complained about the
suppression of evidence in one case, Judge Mack, joined then by Chief Judge
Newman and Judge Ferren, upheld the trial court's order of suppression on Fifth
Amendment (rather than Fourth Amendment) grounds, insisting upon the proposition declared by the Supreme court that Miranda rights must be "scrupulously honored"; where the defendant was in police custody and invoked her
right to counsel, and those rights were not scrupulously honored, the evidence
had to be suppressed, even though the trial court concluded that the defendant
231

Id. at 434-36.

LEGACY AND LEGAL JOURNEY OF THE HON. JULIA COOPER MACK

361

"voluntarily and spontaneously chose to speak., 232 In support of her decision,
Judge Mack also pointed to a then recent Supreme Court decision on custodial
interrogation, 233 determining that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. "234
In a somewhat similar case, some eighteen years after Judge Mack convinced
her colleagues, Chief Judge Newman and Judge Ferren, to join her 1981 opinion,
Judge Mack used a similar analysis to reverse a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance on the ground that the suspect had been subjected to the
functional equivalent of custodial interrogation. 23 5 The other two members of
the panel agreed with the reversal, although one member set forth his own analysis, concluding that the government had conceded that the defendant was in custody when he was questioned.2 3 a In a virtually unprecedented decision to reach
out to reverse the panel in a case that arguably did not fit the requirements for en
banc review (prior decision controls or case is of exceptional importance), a majority of the full court not only granted rehearing en banc but, in 2001, reversed
Judge Mack's 1999 panel opinion.237 Ironically, the government argued to the en
banc court that Mr. Jones was not in custody when he made his incriminating
statement 238 and equally ironical, perhaps, the third member of the panel in the
1999 case, who maintained then that the government had conceded that the defendant was in custody, wrote the majority en banc opinion. 23 9 The majority followed and adopted the government's en banc argument that the custody question
need not be reached because there was no police interrogation; 2 40 rather, Mr.
Jones was asked routine booking questions.24 1
Although she could not help but be deeply distressed at this turn of events,
Judge Mack kept her own counsel, buoyed only by the Supreme Court's then
recent opinion reaffirming Miranda as a constitutional decision, 242 and the fact
that the other member of the original panel also dissented.2 43 She was not one to
compromise constitutional rights, and in her dissent to the en banc majority opin232 United States v. [Vivian] Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 49-50, 51, 52 (D.C. 1981).
233 Id. at 51.
234 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
235 [Elton R.] Jones v. United States, 726 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1999).
236 Id. at 191 (Schwelb, J., concurring); but cf Jones v. United States, 747 A.2d 558, 563-64
(D.C. 1999) (amended form of the opinions) (Schwelb, J., dissenting) (government conceded custody,
but suspect's statement preceded interrogation).
237 Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277 (D.C. 2001) (en banc).
238 Id. at 280-81.
239 Id. at 279.
240 Id. at 281.
241 Id. at 283-84.
242 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
243 Jones, 779 A.2d at 284 (Reid, J., dissenting).
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ion, spoke against the erosion of those rights as interpreted in Miranda, stating in
part:
[T]his case provides a good opportunity to comment on how far this court
(and others) has departed from the directives (reaffirmed and explained) of
the United States Supreme Court in Miranda ...and Innis.... While it can

fairly be said that this court, as an institution, takes pride in its strict adherence to precise statutory and judicial language, in the instant case, the majority, relying primarily on legal reasoning of court decisions in other
jurisdictions, appears to be ignoring the fundamental legal principles it purports to refine.
A paradox meets us initially. The majority tells us that the Miranda warnings apply only if "custodial interrogation" exists, i.e., there must be "custody" and "interrogation" at the same time. Yet the majority does not
reach the question of "custody" (a question vigorously debated throughout
this litigation) because it agrees with the government that, even if the defendant were in custody, his incriminating statement was not the product of
police interrogation. That approach, i.e., to not even recognize the impact
of custody on this case, arguably catapults us back, historically, to the very
reasons for the promulgation of the Miranda rules and their constitutional
underpinnings.24 4
For Judge Mack, the interrogation which occurred in the Jones case and
prompted the incriminating statement did not fit the category of routine booking
questions, as the majority found, that is, questions normally posed when the police are ready to process and "book" a suspect at the police station.
While it is clear that the biographical questions asked of Jones logically relate to him and his predicament, it is equally evident that [the police officer's] queries were not made to facilitate booking. The questions were
asked at the scene [of the alleged crime]. There was no testimony that they
were designed to assist any of the officers in the completion of booking or
other administrative forms.24 5
Judge Mack's refusal to compromise in the Elton R. Jones en banc case was
consistent with her position that constitutional rights should not be compromised,
even in murder cases where a judge might be inclined to "save" the conviction by
resorting to a harmless error analysis. Thus, in a second degree murder case,
where even the majority determined that "the trial court erred, as a matter of
law, in ruling that [the defendant] was not in custody at the time he gave his
written statement and thus erred in concluding that he gave the statement volun244
245

Id. at 288 (Mack, J., dissenting).
Id. at 292.
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tarily[,] ' 24 6 Judge Mack refused to join the majority opinion that used the harm24 7

less error standard, resulting in an affirmance of the judgment of conviction.
She recognized the clear prohibition on custodial interrogation without the Miranda safeguards, especially the right to counsel, but departed from the majority's

reasoning that the constitutional violation did not mandate "automatic reversal"
of the conviction.24 8 Judge Mack wrote: "On the facts of this case, no fair reading

of the record can permit the conclusion that the admission into evidence of [the
defendant's] statement to [the detective] was harmless error. The prosecution, in
proving its case for the charge of second-degree murder, relied almost entirely
249
upon this involuntary statement.,
Judge Mack's historical legacy, her independent spirit, and her steadfast devotion to concepts of liberty and freedom undoubtedly allowed her to focus on the

need for vigilant protection of the rights of vulnerable members of society in the
face of community and political pressures favoring pretrial detention for some
criminal suspects. In a 1981 case that demanded DCCA's attention during the
stormy days of conflict between the more conservative members of the court and
then Chief Judge Newman, Judge Mack stood alone above the fray, filing a full
dissent to the majority opinion written by Chief Judge Newman.250 She began by
reiterating her devotion to the concept of liberty, as well as to the notion that a

person is innocent until proven guilty:
The majority treads where wise men have feared to tread. I am certain that
my Brother Newman is not ruling ou. liberty as a "basic human right." Yet,
this case is as much about the constitutional right to liberty as it is about the

constitutional right to bail. Ironically enough, my concern is not with the
constitutional rights of Marvin L. Edwards, who has entered pleas of guilty
in both cases, and who is no longer being held under the detention statute
he challenges. My concern is with MY constitutional rights for I, like mil-

lions of Americans have lived, for a time at least, believing that the United
246 [Antone D.] Ruffin v. United States, 524 A.2d 685, 699 (D.C. 1987).
247 Id. at 706 (Mack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248 Id. at 707.
249 Id. at 709.
250 The case involved is United States v. [Marvin L.] Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en
banc). At least one of the conservative members of the court accused Chief Judge Newman of
"reaching out" to write the majority opinion in this case. Chief Judge Newman wrote a scholarly
historical and analytical opinion supporting pretrial detention that was joined by all of the conservative members of the court who opposed his re-designation as Chief Judge in 1980. Judge Nebeker,
joined by Judge Harris, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; however, the dissent
focused only on "the unoccasioned announcement by the court that the press has a First Amendment
right to attend pretrial detention hearings." Id. at 1346 (Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Judge Ferren also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; he joined Chief
Judge Newman's analysis of the Eighth Amendment issue, but not his analysis of the Fifth Amendment Due Process issue. Id. at 1351.
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crime
until such time as
States Constitution prohibited my punishment for a 25
1
I have been found guilty of committing that crime.
Judge Mack further embraced the concept of the Constitution as a living document and the central role of the Bill of Rights in securing individual liberty:
I am most receptive to the suggestion that the Constitution is a living document; yet I am not embarrassed to say that it borders on a sacred one. If we
are tempted to believe that it is necessary that we resolve an ambiguity
therein, I would opt for the interpretation that not only makes common
sense but that is the very essence of the Bill of Rights - the preservation of
252
individual liberty.
Turning to classic literature, Judge Mack appeared nicely to tweak her colleagues
for succumbing to community and political pressures to affirm the legality of pretrial detention:
The statute which is the subject of this litigation is a "one-of-a-kind" law
applying only to the District of Columbia. Its provisions, imaginatively
drafted in 1970 by good lawyers who "apparently ... tried to protect the
Act against attack on constitutional grounds," represent a response to what
was thought to be a crisis stemming from crime in the streets. In succumbing to the seductive appeal of sanctioning these provisions designed to
prevent crime through detention, the majority of this court follows the example of the Queen immortalized in literature and described by a distinguished commentator as follows:
Witness this classic exchange in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking
Glass [88 Harper & Bros. Ed. 1902]. The Queen observes that the
King's Messenger "is in prison now, being punished; and the trial
doesn't even begin till next Wednesday; and of course the crime comes
last of all." Perplexed, Alice asks, "Suppose he never commits the
crime?" "That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" The Queen
replies.25 3
B.

The Struggle to Be Heard

Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man 254 comes to mind when the struggles of countless individuals against discrimination and prejudice are considered. Often, part
of the historic struggles against discrimination revolved around efforts to be seen
and heard, whether in the political or judicial arenas. This section highlights
251
252
253
254

Id. at 1365 (Mack, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1368 (Mack, J., dissenting).
id. (footnotes omitted).
(1952).
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three cases involving issues of discrimination, the District of Columbia's anti-discrimination law, and Judge Mack's role in those cases. In light of her own legacy
and experiences, including her work with the EEOC in its formative years, discrimination cases represented more than a passing interest to her.
In 1977, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (the DCHRA), a broad protection against discrimination.
The Council generally intended "to secure an end in the District of Columbia to
discrimination for any reason other than individual merit" by eliminating discrimination based on "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status,
family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, disability, source of income, and place of residence or business., 255 Thus, the DCHRA covered discrimination in employment, housing and commercial space, public
accommodations, and educational institutions.2 56
Prior to the enactment of the 1977 DCHRA by the District's legislature, Samuel Yette, a journalist and reporter for Newsweek magazine was fired in 1972,
less than a year after the publication of his book The Choice: The Issue of Black
Survival in America.257 He filed a discrimination complaint under the District's
earlier police regulation which prohibited an "unlawful employment practice"
based on "race, color, religion, national origin or sex" by an employer. 25 8 The
District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights found that Newsweek had
discriminated against Mr. Yette because of his race and awarded him $1,000 in
damages and $20,000 in attorneys' fees. 2 5 9 A DCCA panel consisting of Judges
Fickling, 260 Gallagher, and Yeagley reversed the Commission on the ground that
26 1
the evidence presented did not support a finding of purposeful discrimination.
Mr. Yette filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The petition was denied,26 2 but
Judge Mack wrote a rather extensive statement of her reasons for voting to grant
2 63
Mr. Yette's petition.
Judge Mack obviously was troubled by the panel's decision and the full court's
decision not to hear Mr. Yette's case. The Commission on Human Rights listened to five days of testimony regarding Mr. Yette's allegations of discrimination, and made factual findings leading to the conclusion that Newsweek violated
255 D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 (2001).
256 D.C. Code § 2-1402.31(a) (2001).
257 (1971).
258 POLICE REGULATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Article 47, § 4(a) (1970).
259 Newsweek Magazine v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights (Samuel F. Yette),
376 A.2d 777, 779 (D.C. 1977).
260 Judge Fickling heard oral argument and participated in the case conference, but died before
the decision in the case was handed down.
261 Newsweek, 376 A.2d at 785.
262 Id. at 794.
263 Id. at 794-798 (Mack, J., Statement of Reasons for Voting to Grant Intervenor Yette's Petition for Rehearing En Banc). Her statement was joined by then Chief Judge Newman.
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the District's unlawful employment practice regulation. When the panel reversed
the Commission's conclusion without a remand for any additional findings
deemed necessary, Judge Mack "[thought the court [had] overstepped the permissive bounds of appropriate review [of an agency's decision] in making its own
assessment of the evidence without regard to any findings of the administrative
agency." 264 She was bothered by the panel's "distressingly superficial understanding of the identity of employment discrimination" and the need for "expert
assistance" and the "technical perception" of a specialized agency such as the
Commission in ferreting out discriminatory conduct.26 5 In short, she argued that
by viewing the case through their own laypersons' lens, members of the panel not
only failed to comprehend the nuances and subtleties of discrimination but also
removed from the specialized commission the assessment of witness credibility
and determination of the weight to be given to the evidence presented. As Judge
Mack stated:
As to the narrow issue in dispute-Yette's claim:of discriminatory treatment versus Newsweek's assertion of Yette's incompetence-the evidence
included, on the one hand the testimony of Yette that he was constantly
embarrassed by, and objected to, crude racial references and nicknames,
that a disproportionate number of his assignments were related to race, that
he was kept for the most part on general "clean-up assignments," and that
eventually-after publication of his book THE CHOICE: ISSUES OF BLACK
SURVIVAL IN AMERICA-meaningful assignments ceased altogether. On
the other hand there was the testimony of an imposing array of Washington
and New York-based Newsweek employees-predominantly male professionals with service going back many years-who attested to the fact that
they had observed no prejudice at the [Washington] Bureau [of Newsweek],
that Yette's work (which some admittedly had complimented) was not up to
Newsweek standards, that he failed to apprise his supervisor of his whereabouts, and that Newsweek had not been offended by Yette's book but had
in fact helped him promote it ....[M]y concern is that this court has taken

from the Human Rights Commissioners-presumably appointed because
they possessed technical perception-the task, inter alia, of assessing the
credibility of witnesses and determining the weight to be accorded their
testimony.2 66

Judge Mack ended her Statement with a tie to history, a comment on the deep
roots of racism, and the possibility of a remedy:
264
265
266

Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 795-96.
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I would note, in conclusion, that millions of Americans recently sat before
their television sets mesmerized by the dramatization of the heritage of another black writer [a reference to Roots by Alex Haley.] It is a tribute to our
psychological growth that we found this production not only entertaining
but historically informative. It does not take much imagination to realize
that vestiges of that history remain deeply ingrained, though dimly perceived, in the very fabric of our society as the "institutionalized" discrimination to which the Congress has alluded. In my opinion it is time, therefore,
that we stop recoiling in a personal sense of outrage at every suggestion of
"racism." It is a time, not to think in terms of "blame" or "fault" or "guilt,"
but rather to make a calm and reasoned assessment as to whether there is in
any given situation a residue of discriminatory "consequences" from the
past, and if so, whether we can devise a remedy26which
might eliminate those
7
suffering.
human
in
cost
least
the
with
effects
Fifteen years later, Judge Mack still attempted to persuade her colleagues to
listen, hear, and understand complaints about discrimination, without putting
complainants through a labyrinthine, time-consuming, and costly process. Carrie
Timus, a mother of a small child, applied for a rental apartment and was turned
down. She filed a discrimination complaint with the District of Columbia Office
of Human Rights (OHR) on December 5, 1986, alleging discrimination on the
basis of family responsibilities, that is, the presence of her two-year-old child. On
March 22, 1990, after finding probable cause that the real estate company had
discriminated against Ms. Timus, the OHR "administratively closed" her case on
the ground that she refused to accept conciliation of her complaint. 26 8 The conciliation contained a "make whole" remedy. After Judge Mack wrote a majority
panel opinion reversing the agency and holding that the DCHRA did not give the
OHR power to promulgate a regulation authorizing dismissal of a complaint
upon the refusal of conciliation, the real estate company that had refused to rent
an apartment to Ms. Timus and her child filed a petition for rehearing en banc,
which was granted.269 The majority en banc court then dismissed Ms. Timus'
petition for review. Its rationale undoubtedly was confusing and bewildering to
267 Id. at 798, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
268 Ms. Timus had asked clarifying questions concerning the "make whole" remedy, some of
which apparently were answered to her satisfaction, and some of which remained unclear from her
perspective. Her letter of August 5, 1988 requesting additional clarification never received a response, but on March 7, 1990, the agency advised Ms. Timus that if she did not accept the make whole
offer, her complaint would be dismissed. She replied on March 19, 1990 that the concerns she expressed in her August 1988 letter had never been addressed. On March 22, 1990, she was advised that
her complaint had been "administratively closed." Timus v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human
Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 754-55 (D.C. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam).
269 Timus v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Serv., No. 90-465 (D.C. 1992), 1992 D.C.
App. LEXIS 77.
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Ms. Timus who, by that time, had spent seven years attempting to get someone or
some agency to hear the merits of her claim of discrimination on the basis of her
family responsibility to her two-year-old child. In an unusual en banc per curiam

decision authored by two different judges, the court decided that the regulation
in question was reasonable and that the court lacked "contested case jurisdiction"
to review its application to Ms. Timus' individual case because, technically, the
agency's dismissal of her case was based on "administrative convenience" and she
270
retained the right to bring a complaint in a trial court.
Then Chief Judge Judith Rogers,2 71 who wrote a concurring opinion on the

jurisdictional/contested case issue when the Timus case was heard by the panel,
fashioned an opinion concurring in the majority's conclusion that the court had
jurisdiction to determine whether Ms. Timus was improperly denied a right to a
hearing before the Commission, but dissenting as to the majority's validation of
the "make whole" regulation.2 72 Judge Mack joined Chief Judge Rogers' opinion
and attached her panel decision as an appendix. The Rogers/Mack opinion
pointed out that the administrative agency's record clearly failed to support the

majority's conclusion that Ms. Timus' complaint was dismissed for administrative
convenience. 27 3 Moreover, their reading of the legislative history of the
270 The majority declared:
The fact that this dismissal [for administrative convenience] leaves the complainant with "all
rights to bring suit if no complaint had been filed," calls squarely into question our authority
to review directly-that is, on contested case review-the application of [the regulation in
question] in any particular case. The reason is that the [District of Columbia Administrative
Procedure Act] expressly excludes from the definition of a contested case "[a]ny matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in any court."
633 A.2d at 760.
271 Judith W. Rogers received the nomination for the DCCA from President Reagan in 1983
and was confirmed by the Senate. She was designated as Chief Judge in 1988, to replace then Chief
Judge Pryor. Currently, she is an Associate Judge of the United States Court of Appeals. Judge
Rogers earned degrees from Radcliffe College and Harvard Law School in 1961 and 1964 respectively. Later, in 1988, she earned a master of laws degree from the University of Virginia Law School.
After completing law school and working as a clerk in the then District of Columbia Juvenile court,
she became an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. She spent part of her
career on endeavors to reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia-working with the United
States Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of Justice in 1967, and from 1969 to
1971, with the Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice. Her work helped to
produce the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. Following
these endeavors, she served as General Counsel to the Congressional Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia, and then accepted a position in the District
government to work on legislation that ultimately resulted in the Home Rule Act. She became Corporation counsel of the District of Columbia in 1979 and remained in that position until her elevation
to the bench. DAILY WASH. L. REP., Nov. 1, 1988, at 2261, 2264.
272 Judge Ferren filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Judge
Steadman lodged a dissenting opinion.
273 Timus, 633 A.2d at 774 (Rogers, C.J., joined by Mack, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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DCHRA provided no support for the proposition that if a complainant refused to
accept a conciliation/make whole offer, the complaint could be dismissed:
"Forced conciliation is a concept that is foreign to the statutory language," as
they put it.2 74 They emphasized the point that under the majority's construction
of the statutory and regulatory scheme governing discrimination complaints, and
the tortured path Ms. Timus would have to follow in accordance with that construction, she might well be barred from bringing a lawsuit because of the statute
of limitations, and in any event she confronted a path of even more "delay and
costly litigation. ' 275 Undoubtedly this construction also would undercut the statutory purpose of the District's civil rights statute and the "expressly determined"
legislative mandate "that the elimination of unlawful discrimination is of 'the
highest priority.' ,276
C. Sexual Orientation Discriminationand a Private University's
Religious Freedom
The third example of Judge Mack's concern for cases of discrimination involved a unique set of circumstances, locking a renowned Catholic universityGeorgetown-in a struggle with students advocating Georgetown's recognition
of a gay rights student organization. DCCA was divided from the outset of this
controversial case. The panel composed of Judges Mack, Ferren, and Terry issued a majority opinion, with Judge Mack dissenting. Judge Ferren, writing for
the majority, framed the issue before the court as follows:
The only issue on appeal.., is whether Georgetown's unwillingness to "recognize" the gay rights groups-as that concept is to be understood-must
be excused on the ground that the Human Rights Act, as applied, impermissibly interferes with the University's constitutional right to the free exercise
of religion. We hold that the Constitution does not afford Georgetown its
2 77
claimed protection.
Thus, the majority sided with the gay rights student organization. Viewing the
case differently, and exercising her independent mind, Judge Mack sought a position that would not undercut the university's doctrinal foundation, but which also
would not cast the gay rights students adrift from the university they chose to
attend, and isolate them in a discriminatory fashion. She minced no words in
rejecting the majority's rationale:
274
275
276
277
1985).

Id. at 772.
Id. at 775-76.
Id. at 775.
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 567, 568 (D.C.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Requiring the Georgetown University to recognize/endorse two gay rights
groups is tantamount to ordering a private actor publicly to embrace the
ideology of another. I cannot concur in this bizarre result; I would hold that
the Human Rights Act does not compel recognition/endorsement. I would
sever the connection between recognition and its incidental benefits, and
would find that by withholding recognition the University has not violated
the Act.2 78

The full court decided to hear the case, but was deeply split over its resolution.
Six opinions resulted-Judge Mack's opinion for the court, Chief Judge Pryor's
concurring opinion, Judge Newman's concurring opinion (joined by Judges Mack,
Ferren and Terry), Judge Ferren's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part (joined by Judge Terry), Judge Belson's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Judge Nebeker), Judge Terry's opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part), and Judge Nebeker's opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
Despite the controversy and the divergent views of members of the court,
Judge Mack forged a majority for the disposition of the case by maintaining her
insistence that "the artificial connection between the 'endorsement' and the tangible benefits contained in Georgetown's scheme of 'University Recognition"'
should be severed. 279 This enabled her to articulate two separate legal principles,
one relating to recognition or endorsement or the historic religious university's
approval of the gay students lifestyle, 280 and the other to gay students' access to
281
the tangible benefits of the university.
Judge Mack set the stage for her conclusion on the recognition or approval
issue by carefully tracing the history of Georgetown and examining in detail the
trial court testimony of Georgetown's then President Timothy S. Healy, S.J. She
focused on the creation of the University in 1789 by John Carroll, a Jesuit priest;
the charter given to Georgetown College in 1815 by the Congress of the United
States; the 1833 decree of the Holy See establishing Georgetown as a Pontifical
University; its incorporation by Congress in 1844; the establishment of its nonprofit corporate status and its designation as a university in 1966; the evolution
of Georgetown's role as an ecclesiastical university with a secular educational
mission; and the meaning of university endorsement or university recognition. 282
278 Id. at 582 (Mack, J., dissenting).
279 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 5
(D.C. 1987).
280 Judges agreeing that the DCHRA did not require Georgetown to grant university endorsement or recognition to a gay student organization were Chief Judge Pryor, and Judges Mack, Newman, Belson, and Nebeker.
281 Judges concluding that the DCHRA required Georgetown to provide tangible benefits to a
gay student organization were Chief Judge Pryor, and Judges Mack, Newman, Ferren, and Terry.
282 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr., 536 A.2d at 5-14.
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Turning to the DCHRA, after invoking the avoidance of constitutional issues if
possible standard, Judge Mack reiterated a legal principle set forth in her panel
dissent: "the Human Rights Act does not require one private actor to 'endorse'
the ideas or conduct of another." 283 Reliance on this legal principle enabled her
to avoid an interpretation of the DCHRA which would directly conflict with the
First Amendment by compelling Georgetown to endorse or recognize the gay
students organization; and further, which would place an appellate court in the
position of violating its own standard that factual findings of the trial court must
be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.28 4 In essence, then, Judge Mack
distilled "endorsement" into "a symbolic gesture, a form of speech by a private,
religiously affiliated educational institution, an entity free to adopt partisan pub28 5
lic positions on moral and ethical issues."
Having made her pronouncements on "endorsement" or "recognition" by a
private actor, Judge Mack adroitly disentangled endorsement and the tangible
benefits offered to Georgetown student groups by asserting:
While the "endorsement" and the tangible benefits may be one for Georgetown's administrative purposes, they are not so in the eyes of the
Human Rights Act, nor are they so in the eyes of the First Amendment
....We open up the package of "University Recognition" and examine its
286
contents separately.
Judge Mack's separate examination of the tangible benefits began with the propositions that the DCHRA "provides legal mechanisms to ensure equality of
treatment, not equality of attitudes"; and that "[t]o read into the Human Rights
Act a requirement that one private actor must 'endorse' another would be to
287
render the statute unconstitutional.
But before she could declare that Georgetown could not deny gay students
tangible benefits, Judge Mack had to confront the implications of Georgetown's
free exercise of religion right on its statutory obligation to grant those benefits.
She first determined that:
[Georgetown] allowed the homosexual orientation of the individuals involved-not just the "purposes and activities" of their student organiza- o
tions-to creep into its decision-making. By failing to confine its objections
283 Id. at 17.
284 Judge Mack adhered to the legal principle that "[a]n appellate court may not usurp the role
of the factfinder," thus prompting her to declare:
We cannot label "clearly erroneous" [the trial court's] "endorsement" finding, i.e., that "University Recognition" at Georgetown contains an expression of religious approval or neutrality towards a student group obtaining that status.
Id. at 19.
285 Id. at 20.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 21.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

to "purposes and activities" which it found offensive for reasons indepen28 8
dent of the sexual orientation of the students, Georgetown discriminated.
Then, in response to Georgetown's argument that it was exempt from the reach
of the DCHRA and its mandate of equal treatment with respect to tangible benefits, Judge Mack launched into a rather extensive analysis of First Amendment
Free Exercise clause cases emanating from the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as the District legislature's decision to include sexual orientation as
part of the DCHRA, sociological and behavioral studies of homosexuality, and
whether the protection of sexual orientation constituted a compelling governmental interest. She concluded that "[t]he eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling governmental interest" which "outweighs the burden
that compliance with the Human Rights Act would impose on Georgetown's religious exercise"; and that "there are no available means of eradicating sexual
orientation discrimination in educational
institutions that would be less restrictive
289
of Georgetown's religious exercise."
Judge Mack's majority opinion in the Gay Rights case is remarkable because
she did not deviate from her assessment of the case or compromise her views to
forge a unanimous opinion. Yet, she navigated her way through controversial
and complicated issues so skillfully that four other judges concurred separately or
concurred in her result. 290 Her opinion also is remarkable because it avoided
weakening the District's basic anti-discrimination law, even as it reaffirmed the
288 Id. at 29-30.
289 Id. at 39.
290 Then Chief Judge Pryor "adopt[ed] the holdings of Judge Mack's opinion," but wrote a
brief concurrence explaining what he deemed to be "the effect of [the] decision." Id. at 39-40. Judge
Newman joined Judge Mack's conclusions but wrote separately, especially with respect to the analysis
of the Free Exercise clause issue; Judges Mack, Ferren and Terry joined in Part VI of his concurrence
regarding Judge Belson's views of the District legislature's addition of sexual orientation to the list of
protected statuses under the DCHRA. Id. at 46. Judge Ferren's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part was joined by Judge Terry. Judge Ferren rejected the distinction between tangible and
intangible benefits under the DCHRA, addressed and rejected aspects of Judge Belson's analysis, and
set forth his own analysis of the Free Exercise clause issue. Id. at 46-62. Judge Belson, joined by
Judge Nebeker, concurred in part and dissented in part. He concluded, in part, that if there was a
conflict between the rights of Georgetown and those of a gay student organization, Georgetown's
rights were "paramount." While he joined Judge Mack's opinion relating to the endorsement/recognition issue, he disagreed with the sections concerning Georgetown's obligation to provide tangible
benefits to a gay student organization, and Georgetown's Free Exercise clause rights. Id. at 62-74.
Judge Terry concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that the DCHRA requires Georgetown to grant both "University Recognition" and tangible benefits. Id. at 74-5. Judge Nebeker,
who also joined Judge Belson's opinion, concurred in part and dissented in part. He began his opinion by asserting that: "Today the court uses the state's power to force a religious body, contrary to its
basic tenets, to provide services and facilities to those who advocate and proselytize abnormal and
criminal sexual practices." He "[found] no factor favoring a state interest under the [DCHRA] which
can be balanced against Georgetown's rights," and thought "there [was] every reason in law to hold
absolute Georgetown's rights." Id. at 75.
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historic religious roots of a private university; it honored the intent of the District's legislature by recognizing that sexual orientation stood alongside race,
ethnicity and gender as a protected status in the District of Columbia; and it
offered an opportunity to a renowned university based in the District of Columbia to continue to take advantage of financing schemes requiring some action by
the District of Columbia government, such as the issuance of bonds to support
capital projects like dormitory construction, without a violation of the District's
anti-discrimination laws. Much has been written about Judge Mack's approach to
the Gay Rights case. Perhaps no one sums up what Judge Mack accomplished
better than one of her former law clerks, Professor Walter J. Walsh: "Judge Mack
dares to frame the fearful symmetry of gay rights, religious freedom, and racial
equality. 2 91
Our venture into these final areas of pretrial detention and custodial interrogation, allegations of racial discrimination in employment and housing, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation helps to sustain the validity of our
thesis: Through twenty-six years of her tenure as an active and senior judge of the
DCCA, Judge Julia Perry Cooper Mack kept her own counsel, and her numerous
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions were influenced neither by the exterior political world surrounding her, nor by the exhortations of her DCCA colleagues. Rather, Judge Mack's approach to the resolution of legal issues as an
Associate Judge and, later, as a Senior Judge of the DCCA, was impacted by her
heritage, her quiet opposition to injustice, her deep concern for the vulnerable
members of American society, and her notions of fair play and justice, all
spawned by and grounded in her experiences in North Carolina and the nation's
capital.

291 Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality, 40 How. L.J. 513, 570 (1997). In addition to his own analysis of the Gay Rights case, Professor
Walsh summarizes what other scholars have written about the case. Id. at 530-53.

